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No. 74--3413. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit. 
Aug. 20, 1975. 
A class action was instituted on be-
half of all black persons who had taken 
and failed the Georgia bar examination, 
contending that the examination was un-
constitutional on due process and equal 
protection grounds. The United States 
District Court for the Northern District 
of Georgia, at Atlanta, William C. O'Kel-
Iey, J., granted summary judgment hold-
ing the examination constitutional, and 
plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Dyer, Circuit Judge, held, inter 
alia, that the bar examination was not 
intentionally discriminatory, that it was 
not inherently discriminatory by virtue 
of the disproportionate number of black 
applicants for admission to the bar who 
failed it, and that the failure to provide 
any procedure for review of a failing 
grade at the behest of the examinee did 
not constitute a denial of due process of 
law. 
Affirmed. 
Adams, Circuit Judge, dissented and 
filed opinion. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure <ll::=>2481 
In view of undisputed evidence of 
anonymity of grading process, allega-
tions in class action brought on behalf of 
all black persons who had taken and 
failed the Georgia bar examination, to 
effect that bar examiners utilized exami-
nation as device to purposefully discrimi-
nate against prospective black attorneys 
on basis of race, presented .no genuine 
issue of material fact which would re-
quire trial, and summary judgment was 
therefore properly entered against plain-
tiffs. U .S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc. rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Constitutional Law <ll::=>208(1) 
Discriminatory motivation, even if 
proved, is not in itself a constitutional 
violation, and becomes so i>nly wht:n it is 
given opportunity to manifest itself in 
discriminatory conduct. U.S.C.A.Const. 
Amend. 14. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <ll::=>2470.2 
In opposing motion for summary 
judgment, party is entitled not only to 
have facts viewed in light most favor-
able to it but also to all reasonable infer-
ences which may be drawn from these 
facts; inferences nonmoving party seeks 
to draw, however, must be reasonable. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 56(c), 28 U.S. 
C.A. 
4. Federal Civil Procedure <ll::=>2481 
In suit in which plaintiff contended, 
inter alia, that Georgia bar examiners 
utilized bar examination as device to 
purposefully discriminate against pro-
spective black attorneys on basis of race, 
Synopees, Syllabi and Key Number Cl ... iricalioa 
COPYRIGHT @ 1975, by WEST PUBLISHING CO. 
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inference that use by black applicants of 
"Black English" idiom presented viable 
opportunity for examiners to engage in 
overt racial discrimination against blacks 
was unreasonable as matter of law and 
therefore insufficient basis upon which 
to deny motion for summary judgment 
against plaintiffs. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
rule 66(c), 28 l!.S.C.A. 
5. Federal Civil Procedure ~2470.2 
In determining, for purposes of con-
sidering motion for summary judgment, 
whether factual inference which party 
seeks to draw is a reasonable one, court 
need not ignore existence of other evi-
dence of record which tends to make 
that inference more or less plausible. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 56(c, e, f), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
6. Constitutional Law <::=215 
Traditional equal protection analysis, 
not standards developed by Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity O>mmission for 
employment testing covered by title VI 
of Civil Rights Act of 1964, was proper 
standard for judging allegations that 
Georgia bar examination inherently de-
nied equal pr;tection of the law to black 
applicants because of much greater rate 
at which they failed examination; there 
WM therefore no basis for a holding that 
bar examination was required to be pro-
fessionally validated or that bar examin-
ers were required to demonstrate una-
vailability of alternative means of mea-
suring professional competence. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq. as 
amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.; 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. 
7. Constitutional Law ~208(1) 
Hallmark of rational classification is 
not merely that it differentiates, but 
that it does so on basis having fair and 
substantial relationship to purposes of 
classification. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 
14. 
8. Constitutional Law <::=215 
"Rational relationship" test was 
properly applied to judge contention that 
Georgia bar examination inherently de-
nied equal protection of law to black ap-
.plicants because of greater rate at which 
they failed examination, despite conten-
tion that "compelling state interest" test 
was proper because disproportionate 
passing rate of black and white appli-
cants on examination served to create 
suspect classification based on race such 
as is needed to trigger strict judicial 
scrutiny. U .S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. 
9. Constitutional Law <::=215 
Otherwise legitimate classification 
does not become constitutionally suspect 
merely because greater number of racial 
minority fall in group disadvantaged by 
classification. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 
14. 
10. Civil Rights <::= 13.13(3) 
Statistical evidence of disparate ra-
cial impact alone may establish prima 
facie case of racial discrimination, shift-
ing to defendant burden of demonstrat-
ing that invidious discrimination was not 
among reasons for his action. 
11. Attorney and Client <::=4 
State has legitimate and substantial 
interest in excluding from practice of 
law those persons who do not meet its 
standard of minimal competence. 
12. Attorney and Client <::=6 
Georgia bar examination tests skills 
and knowledge which have logical, ap-
parent relationship to those necessary in 
practice of law. 
13. Constitutional Law <::=208(1) 
While party defending classification 
subject to strict judicial scrutiny must 
demonstrate that state has no other 
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available alternative which impinges less 
on protected interest involved, focus of 
rational relationship test is not whether 
state has superior means available to ac-
complish its objectives, but whether 
means it has chosen is reasonable one. 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. 
14. Attorney and Client <2=6 
Georgia bar examination was not ir-
rationally administered because its out-
come depended heavily on subjective 
grading judgments of examiners. 
15. Federal Civil Procedure <2=2481 
In action in which plaintiffs alleged 
that Georgia state bar examination ille-
ga11y discriminated against blacks, argu-
ments that examiners should unifonnly 
be required to use model answers and 
predetennined standards in grading 
were merely suggestions for improve-
ment and did not raise fact issue as to 
whether examination itself was rational. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. 
16. Attorney and Client 41=6 
In proceeding in which plaintiffs 
contended that Georgia state bar exami-
nation works to discriminate against 
blacks, irrationality of examination was 
not shown by practice of board of law 
examiners in the grading failing papers 
falling close to passing mark or in com-
paring examination results with law 
school records as infonnal check of ex-
aminers' perfonnance. 
17. Attorney and Client <~=6 
It was not irrational for law exam-
iners to compare results of bar examina-
tion with law school records as one infor-
mal, after-the-fact means of judging 
quality of examination. 
18. Attorney and Client 41=6 
Georgia bar examination had ration-
al relationship to applicant's fitness to 
practice law and was not inherently dis-
criminatory against blacks by virtue of 
mere fact that examination was failed 
by much higher percentage of black than 
whites. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. 
19. Constitutional Law <~=287 
Primarily because unqualified right 
to retake examination at its next regu-
larly scheduled administration both satis-
fied purpose of hearing and afforded its 
protection, black applicants for admission 
to practice of law were not denied due 
process by virtue of fact that they were 
denied any procedure for review of fail-
ing grade in bar examination. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Amend. 14. 
20. Constitutional Law 41=305(2) 
While opportunity to be heard is 
generally considered fundamental com-
ponent of due process, entitlement to 
rehearing does not automatically flow 
from finding that procedural due process 
is applicable. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. 
21. Constitutional Law ~ 
Whether due process requires partic-
ular procedure in given situation must 
be detennined by balancing individual's 
interest in avoiding loss which lack of 
procedure inflicts upon him against in-
terest which government seeks to ad-
vance by denying it. U.S.C.A.Const. 
Amend. 14. 
Appeals fn_>m the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia. 
Before GEWIN, DYER and ADAMS: 
Circuit Judges. 
DYER, Circuit Judge: 
This appeal presents a broad-based 
challenge to the constitutionality of the 
• Of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation. 
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Georgia bar examination on due process 
and equal protection grounds. This suit 
before us, which has been certified by 
the district court as a class action on 
behalf of all black persons who have tak-
en and flll1ed the Georgia bar examina-
tion and bav.e not been admitted to the 
practice of law in Georgia, as well as all 
black persons who will take the exami-
nation in the future, results from the 
consolidation of several suits brought by 
black individuals who have been unsuc-
cessful on the examination. 
Summarized briefly, the Georgia bar 
examination is a two-day test adminis-
tered biannually by the Georgia State 
Board of Bar Examiners (the Board), a 
group of five practicing lawyers appoint-
ed by the Georgia Supreme Court. Since 
February, 1972, the examination has 
been composed one-half of essay ques-
tions prepared and graded by the bar 
examiners, and one-half of the multiple 
choice Multistate Bar Examination 
(MBE), prepared and graded by the N a-
tiona! Conference of Bar Examiners 
(NCBE), and administered simultaneous-
ly to bar examinees in a majority of 
states~ Following grading, the scores on 
the essay and MBE portions of the ex-
amination are combined into a final 
grade according to one of three formulas 
recommended by the NCBE and selected 
by the Board. It has also been the prac-
tice of the Board, prior to final certifica-
tion of the examination results, to con-
vene and regrade failing papers which 
meet certain criteria such as falling close 
to the minimum passing score of 70, re-
ceiving a passing grade from a certain 
minimum number of examiners, or being 
recommended for regrading by an exam-
iner. A1J a result of this reconsideration, 
a previously failing grade is on occasion 
raised to a passing score. No other re-
view of a grade is provided. 
The central focus of this litigation 
clearly is that black applicants as a class 
have traditionally experienced particular 
difficulty in passing the Georgia bar ex-
amination. This unfortunate situation 
reached a nadir in July, 1972, when each 
of the 40 black applicants taking the ex-
. amination failed. On the February and 
July, 1973, examinations, slightly more 
than one-half the black applicants were 
unsu~essful, as compared to a failure 
rate of roughly one-fourth to one-third 
among white examinees. 
Appellants' challenges to the constitu-
tionality of the bar examination fall into 
three major areas. They claim: 1) that 
the examiners have used the bar exami-
nation to purposefully discriminate 
against black applicants on the basis of 
race; 2) that the bar examination inher-
ently violates the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause because of 
the highly disparate passing rates of 
black and white applicants; and 3) that 
the examination violates due process be-
cause there is no procedure for review of 
a failing grade. 
Following extensive discovery by both 
sides which lasted several months, the 
district court granted summary judg-
ment to appellees on each of these 
claims. Mter careful consideration of 
the r ecord, we conclude that that court 
was correct in holding that there were 
no genuine issues of material fact to be 
resolved and that appellees were entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. We 
therefore affirm its judgment. 
I. INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION 
[1] Appellants' first major contention 
is that the bar examiners utilize the ex-
amination as a device to purposefully 
discriminate against prospective black 
attorneys on the basis of race. The dis-
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"totally without factual foundation," and 
hence appropriate for summary disposi-
tion. We agree that it presents no genu-
ine issue of material fact which would 
require a trial. 
[2] In so holding, we are mindful of 
the Supreme Court's admonition that 
"summary procedures should be used 
sparingly where motive and 
intent play leading roles." Poller v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, 1962, 368 
U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 491, 7 L.Ed.2d 
458. However, discriminatory motiva-
tion, even if proved, is not in itself a 
constitutional violation, Palmer v. 
Thompson, 1971, 403 U.S. 217, 91 S.Ct. 
1940, 29 L.Ed.2d 438, and becomes so 
only when given the opportunity to man-
ifest itself in discriminatory conduct. 
Accordingly, appellees undertook to ne-
gate the materiality of intent as an issue 
of fact in this case not merely by deny-
. ing racial animus but also by affirma-
tively demonstrating their inability to 
discover an applicant's race before grad-
ing had been completed. 
The bulk of the evidence on this point 
was introduced through the deposition of 
Estes, an employee of the Georgia Su-
preme Court serving as Administrative 
Assistant to the Board, and the official 
primarily responsible for implementing 
the procedures designe_d to insure ano-
nymity in the grading process. The sub-
stance of Estes' testimony was that 
1. It was Estes' practice to open the container 
and begin matching names and numbers while 
the examiners were engaged in regrading. 
This matching was limited solely to numbers 
which the examiners had previously certified 
as having passed the examination; none of 
those not certified as passing were matched, 
whether the examination paper was being re-
graded or not. Moreover, the examiners were 
not notified of the status of any examinee until 
a decision had been reached on all papers. 
while applicants are seated alphabetical-
ly and identified by name cards in the 
examination room, examination papers 
are identified and graded by number 
only. These numbers are drawn at ran-
dom on individual cards by the appli-
cants, who write their names on the 
cards and place them in sealed envelopes. 
These envelopes are then collected, 
sealed in a container in the examination 
room, and kept in the container in his 
custody throughout the grading process.1 
This testimony, which was uncontradict-
ed,% was sufficient to show the absence 
of any genuine issue of material fact as 
to the examiners' direct access to infor-
mation concerning an examinee's race 
during grading. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 
Despite the examiners' inability to di-
rectly discover an applicant's race, appel-
lants contend that a fact issue regarding 
intentional racial discrimination is iruer-
entially raised by the deposition of Dr. J. 
L. Dillard, linguist and author of Black 
English: Its History and Usage in the 
United States (1972). According to Dr. 
Dillard, many black persons tend to 
speak an English variant, characterized 
by structures such as the pre-verbal use 
of "been", which has been coined Black 
English. While all formal education, 
and in particular that at predominantly 
black institutions, attempts to inculcate 
Standard English usage rather Black 
English, Dr. Dillard opined that a person 
2. Appellants attempted to counter this . testi-
mony with, for example, evidence that the "A" 
envelopes in which names and numbers were 
sealed were not completely opaque. But this 
evidence in no way speaks to the fact that the 
"A" envelopes were placed in another sealed 
container in the examination room. Thus, any 
person wishing to look into these envelopes 
for discriminatory purposes would have to ex-
amine them individually in the examination 
room, in full view of Board officials, exam 
monitors, and the examinees. 
- 6a -
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who had spoken this dialect during his 
youth might revert to it under situations 
of extreme time pressure, such as during 
a bar examination. From this testimony 
appellants wish us to draw the twin fac-
. tual inferences that black applicants uti-
lized a 1) unique and 2) recognizable 
writing style on the examination, provid-
ing the bar examiners with the opportu-
nity to intentionally discriminate against 
black examinees, and hence raising a 
fact issue a.~· to whether they had actual-
ly done so. 
[3] In opposing a motion for summa-
ry judgment, a party is entitled not only 
to have the facts viewed in the light 
most favorable to it but also to all rea-
sonable inferences which may be drawn 
from these facts. Harvey v. Great At-
lantic & Pacific Tea Co., 5 Cir. 1968, 388 
F.2d 123, 1.24---25; Liberty Leasing Co. v. 
Hillsum Sales Corp., 5 Cir. 1967, 380 F .2d 
1013, 1014-15. The inferences the non-
moving party seeks to draw, however, 
must be "reasonable," and it is in this 
respect that we find Dr. Dillard's deposi-
tion insufficient to controvert appellees' 
properly supported motion for summary 
judgment. 
[4] A major reason is that the deposi-
tion itself directly contradicts both infer-
ences appellants would have us draw 
from it. In response to questioning by 
appellees' counsel regarding the racial 
uniqueness of Black English, Dr. Dillard 
testified that the incidence of the dialect 
was not limited to blacks, but was, in his 
words, "a major factor that differenti-
ates so-called Southern dialect." He spe-
3. Appellants also contend that Black English 
may result in overt discrimination even if the 
examiner does not recognize its use as a racial 
characteristic but merely reacts negatively be· 
cause he conceives it to be incorrect. As this 
claim Is equally susceptible to all of the other 
reasons we cite for concluding that no materi-
cifically testified that some southern 
whites would use similar or identical 
grammatical construction and that for 
those whiles who had learned this patois 
in their youths, "(t]he trends of reversion 
are the same, of course." On the issue 
of the dial ect's racial recognizability, Dr. 
Dillard testified that it was highly un-
like ly that an individual untrained in lin-
guistics would recognize the use of Black 
English as a "black" characteristic, or 
indeed as anything other than incorrect 
standard English.3 Both of these obser-
vations, which are in direct contradiction 
to the use of Dr. Dillard's linguistic theo-
ries which appellants wish to make in 
this lawsuit, in our view render the in-
fe rence that Black English presents a 
viable opportunity for the Board to en-
gage in overt racial discrimination un-
reasonable as a matter of law. 
[5] Two other factors support this 
conclusion. First, in determining wheth-
er a factual inference a party seeks to 
draw is a reasonable one, we need not 
ignore the existence of other evidence of 
record which tends to make that infer-
ence more or less plausible. First Na-
tion! Bank v. Cities Service Co., 1968, 391 
U.S. Z53, 284-86, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 
L.Ed.2d 569. Here, such relevant record 
evide nce is the MBE, which has com-
prised one-half of the Georgia bar exam-
ination since February, 1972. The sig-
nificance of the MBE, as a multiple 
choice test, is that its scores are immune 
to any varia tion arising from the use of 
Black English.4 After perusing the 
al issue of fact exists on this claim, we need 
not address ourselves to its intrinsic merits. 
4. Dr. Dillard specifically testified that a back-
ground in Black English would have no ad-
verse effect on an educated individual's com-
prehension of even very difficult standard Eng-
lish. 
- 7a -
TYLER v. VICKERY 
MBE results, the district court observed 
that on the July, 1972 examination, 
when each of the 40 black applicants 
failed, only one passed the MBE but 
failed the examination as a whole. It 
also noted that the results on subsequent 
examinations were comparable and that 
the director of testing of the NCBE had 
testified that it would be impossible for 
a state board of examiners to set the 
cutoff score so as to intentionally 
achieve this result. Obviously, these 
facts also tend to seriously undercut the 
inference that the difficulty of black ap-
plicants on the examination is due to 
language bias arising from the use of 
Black English. In the words of the Su-
preme Court in First National, supra, 
they "conclusively show that the facts 
upon which (appellants relied] to support 
[their] allegation were not susceptible of 
the interpretation which [they] sought to 
give them." 391 U.S. at 289, 88 S.Ct. at 
1593. 
Finally, this is not a case where the 
substitution of speculative inferences for 
the "specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial" demanded by 
Rule 56(e) is to be treated indulgently. 
See Smith v. Local 25, Sheet Metal 
Workers, 5 Cir. 1974, 500 F.2d 741, 749. 
Fed.RCiv.P. 56(f) requires that a party 
unable to show facts essential to his op-
position present to the court the reasons 
for its inability to produce such evidence. 
Here there was not only no request for 
further discovery, but the record affirm-
atively shows that appellants were fur-
nished with the examination papers writ-
ten by all applicants on the July, 1972 
examination. Thus, were there more 
a. Appellants also argue that we may find the 
bar examiners guilty of "intentional'' discrimi-
nation merely for having continued to adminis-
ter the examination with knowledge of its ad-
verse Impact on black applicants. This is of 
than surmise to the asserted connection 
between Black English and the poor 
showing of black bar applicants, appel-
lants had both the means and the duty 
tO bring the pertinent facts forward. 
Their failure to do so cannot be con-
strued as creating a fact issue precluding 
summary judgment.5 
II. INHERENT DISCRIMINATION 
Appellants' second contention is that, 
irrespective of intent, the Georgia bar 
examination inherently denies equal pro-
tection of the laws to black applicants 
because of the much greater rate at 
which they fail the examination. The 
two major issues that we must resolve in 
connection with this claim are: 1) the 
standard of judicial review which is ap-
plicable when only disparate perform-
ance by race has been shown, and 2) 
whether a material issue of fact remains 
that the applicable standard had been 
satisfied. As is frequently the case in 
equal protection suits, the first issue 
largely controls the second. 
The district court determined that the 
appropriate standard of review was the 
"rational relationship" test, and that the 
Georgia bar examination satisfied this 
norm as a matter of law. For reasons 
that shall appear, we agree with the dis-
trict court's ultimate conclusion on both 
points. 
[6] Appellants' primary suggestion is 
that we should not view the Georgia bar 
examination within the framework of 
traditional equal protection . analysis at 
all, but should instead apply by analogy 
the standards developed by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission 
course no more than a sophisticated restate-
ment of the claim that the bar examination is 
inherently unconstitutional, which we treat in 
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for employment testing covered by Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (EEOC 
guidelines). As construed by the Su-
preme Court in Gri~ v. Duke Power 
Co.,. 1971, 401 U.S. , 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 
L.:f;d.2d 158, Title VII precludes the use 
of testing procedures which dispropor-
tionately exclude protected minorities, 
regardless ·of intent or motivation, unless 
th~y are "demonstrably a reasonable 
measure of job performance." ld. at 
436, 91 S.Ct. at 856. Under the perti-
nent EEOC guidelines, which we have 
recognized to be a highly persuasive in-
terpretation of Title VII, United States 
v. Georgia Power Co., 5 .Cir. 1973, 474 
F .2d 906, 913, 
[t]he use of any test which adversely 
affects hiring, promotion, _ transfer or 
any other employment or ~~mbership 
opportunity of classes protected by Ti-
tle VII constitutes discrimination un-
less: (a) the test has been validated 
and evidences a high degree of utility 
as hereinafter described, and (b) the 
person giving or acting upon the re-
sults of the particular test can demon-
strate that alternative suitable hiring, 
transfer or promotion procedures are 
unavailable for his use. 
29 C.F.R § 1607.3 {1974). Since it is 
undisputed that the G€orgia bar exami-
nation has a greater adverse impact on 
bl~ applicants than on whites and has 
never been the subject of a professional 
validation study, acceptance of appel-
lants' suggested standard of review 
would inexorably compel the conclusion 
that the examination is unconstitutional. 
C. Douglas v. Hampton, D.C.Cir. 1975, 512 F.2d 
976; Davis v. Washington, D.C.Cir. 1975, 512 
F.2d 956; Walston v. County School Board, 4 
Cir. 1974, 492 F.2d 919; United States v. Ches-
terfield County School Dist., 4 Cir. 1973, 484 
F.2d 70; Castro v. Beecher. 1 Cir. 1972, 459 
Title VII does not apply by its terms, 
of course, because the Georgia Board of 
Bar Examiners is neither an "employer," 
an "employment agency," nor a "labor 
organization" within the meaning of the 
statute. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e. Nonethe-ll 
less, appellants argue that it is appropri-
ate to look to Title VII and its imple-
menting guidelines to flesh out the four-
teenth amendment equal protection 
guarantee both because the statute and 
the amendment share the common goal 
of interdicting racial discri-mination and 
beca,.w>e the bar examination is in reality 
an "employment test;" indeed, they 
point out that the stakes are much high-
er than in an ordinary employment test-
ing situation because failure results not 
in the loss of a specific job opportunity 
but in denial of the right to practice law 
in an entire state. 
Quite understandably, appellees take 
the position that whether or not the bar 
examination meets the standards of a 
facially inapplicable statute is simply ir-
relevant to its constitutionality. This 
observation would ordinarily be all the 
discussion the point would warrant. 
However, as authority for their argu-
ment that Title VII and the fourteenth 
amendment should be equated, appel-
lants have cited to us a number of 
Courts of Appeals decisions from other 
Circuits which have utilized the four-
teenth amendment to apply Title VII 
and the EEOC guidelines virtually ver-
batim to employment tests administered 
by various public agencies.' We have 
given these decisions careful considera- ' 
tion, but on close analysis we conclude · 
F.2d 725; Chance v. Board of Examiners, 2 
Cir. 1972, 458 F.2d 1167; Carter v. Gallagher, ' 
8 Cir. 1971, 452 F.2d 315, mod. 1972, 452 F.2d 
327 (en bane), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950, 92 
S .Ct. 2045, 32 L.Ed.2d 338. . 
._, 
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there are several fundamental reasons 
why their principles cannot be extended 
to reach the Georgia bar examination as 
appellants suggest. 
The ill"St of these reasons is that, 
viewed in the perspective of their some-
what unique factual context, the cases 
I on which appellants rely do not necessar-ily stand for the sweeping propositions for which they cite them. The courts 
which have treated the fourteenth 
amendment and Title VII as embodying 
fungible standards have done so only in 
the narrow context of employment tests 
administered by governmental entities 
such as police and fire departments. 
This is significant because Title VII, as 
originally enacted, provided a specific 
exemption from the Act's requirements 
for governmental units. Thus, in suits 
involving challenges to the personnel 
practices of public agencies, ·courts were 
ft:e<Iuently confronted by the anomalous 
situation of a public employer who was 
theoretically free to engage in selection 
practices which would be clearly illegal 
for a private employer under Title VII. 
But prior to the time of appellate deci-. 
sion in each of these cases but Carter v. 
Gallagher, supra, this anomaly had been 
potentially removed by Congress' enact-
ment of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. 92- 261, 86 
Stat. 103, which deleted the governmen-
tal exemption from Title VII and clearly 
~pressed Congressional intent to reach 
the employment practices of the agencies 
in question; however, direct Title VII 
relief was still barred by the fact that 
the complaints had been filed prior to 
the 1972 amendments to the Act. 
I The ,res~nse of some courts was to bridge this gap by VIrtually incor.£2[.at-ing Tifle- vu ana the EEOC guidelines 
into the fourteenth amendrrent. What-
ever the justl1ication for this !ipproach in 
these narrow circumstances, we think it 
overly simplistic to read these decisions, 
as lJ.ppellant would have us do, as au-
thority for the general proposition that 
Title VII and the equal protection clause 
should be read interchangeably whenev-
er the goals to be served are the same 
and the subject matter is at least argu-
ably related, particularly when the deci-
sions have not been read so broadly by 
the Circuits that rendered them.7• 
A second important consideration is 
that the cases on which appellants rely 
do not state the controlling law of this 
Circuit, but are in fact contrary to it. 
We confronted the issue of testing for 
public employment in Allen v. City of 
Mobile, 5 Cir. 1972, 466 F.2d 122, which 
involved a challenge to the constitution-
ality of a written test used by the Mo-
bile, Alabama police department as part 
of its requirements for promotion to the 
rank of sergeant. The district court sus-
tained this test despite a showing of de-
monstrable adverse impact on blacks. In 
doing so, it recognized the relevance of 
Griggs' holding that tests which disad-
vantage ·minorities should be job-related, 
but declined to use this as a springboard 
to apply the full panoply of EEOC 
guidelines to a test falling outside the 
scope of Title VII; it specifically refused 
to require that the test be professionally 
validated. Instead, the court personally 
examined the challenged test and can-
eluded that the skills it measured, such 
as reading and comprehension, memory, 
note-taking and verbal skills, were useful 
attributes for a policeman, particularly 
one in a supervisory position. Based on 
this conclusion, it upheld the test on the 
ground that "[i]t bears a rational rela~ 
tionship to the ability to perfonn the 






TYLER v. VICKERY 
work required." Allen v. City of Mobile, 
S.D.Ala.1971, 331 F.Supp. 1134, 1146. 
On appeal, the sole issue was whether 
the district court had applied the correct 
legal standard in dealing with the test. 
We affirmed per curiam, on the basis of 
the district court's order and decree. 
Moreover, Judge Crt>ldberg's dissenting 
opinion removed any remaining doubt 
that, in affirming, we squarely confront-
ed and rejected the contention that Title 
VII and its implementing EEOC guide-
lines were applicable to testing outside 
the scope of the Act. In an exhaustive 
opinion, Judge Goldberg argued that the 
majority had erred in declining to follow 
precisely the cases on which appellants 
rely and in refusing to hold, as had they, 
that Title VII standards may be applied 
by analogy through the fourteenth 
amendment. 
Thus, were the precise issue decided by 
the cases on which appellants rely before 
us today, we would be compelled to re-
ject their holdings on the authority of 
our decision in Allen. See McClure v. 
First Nat1 Bank, 5 Cir. 1974, 497 F.2d 
490, 492. Needless to say, this faet "lrlso 
makes appellants' cases somewhat less 
than persuasive authority in this Circuit. 
However, even were we not con-
strained by Allen, we would view a sub-
sequent Supreme Court decision, which 
declined the opportunity to equate the 
equal protection clause and Title VII in 
a similar situation, as the most per-
suasive authority on the proper relation-
ship between t an nth 
amendment. I Geduldig v. Aiello 1974, 
417 u.s. 484, .Ed.2d 
256, the Supreme Court dealt with the 
question of whether the California Un-
employment Compensation Disability 
Fund could, consonantly with the equal 
protection clause, exclude disabilities as-
sociated with normal pregnancy from 
the fund's coverage. While this state-
administered plan was outside the scope 
of Title VII, as is the Georgia bar exami-
nation, this precise issue was the subject 
of an EEOC regulation promulgated pur-
suant to Title VII, which stated in perti-
nent part that ". . payment under 
any temporary disability plan 
. , formal or informal, shall be ap-
plied to disability due to pregnancy or 
childbirth on the same terms and condi-
tions as they are applied to other tempo-
rary disabilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.-
10(b)(1974) 
The Supreme Court, however, conclud-
ed that since normal pregnancy is an 
objectively identifiable physical condi-
tion, distinctions involving pregnancy do 
not constitute sex-based classifications 
unless they are shown to be mere pre-
texts for invidious discrimination against 
one sex or the other. By applying the 
rational relationship test, the COurt then 
lOund that California's exclusion of such 
disabilities from the fund's coverage was 
consistent with the equal protection 
clause. But perhaps more significant 
than its holding is the fact that, in 
reaching its conclusion that "this case is 
thus a far cry from cases . . ~ 
volving discnmmah on · based on ender 
as~h," . at n. S.Ct. at 
2492, the Court felt it necessary neither 
to distingu·ish nor even to mention the 
EEOC's contrary view under Title VII, 
even though under appellants' suggested 
analysis the EEOC guideline would have 
conclusively established that the exclu-
sion of pregnancy related disabilities 
constitu!fti~legal sex discrimination. In 
our vi~~ unmistakable import of the 
S.!!£;eme COurt's_ methOd of analysis_ is 
that a constitutionaT cha llenge "tO ,g. 
method of classification must be decided 
by constitutional standards, and t hat 
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to ~ deference in detennining what 
~ in£ended: tZ accomphsfitfirgugh 
Title£[, Albemarle Paper CO. v. Moody, 
1975, - U.S. - , 95 S.Ct. 2362, 44 
L.Ed..2d --, they do not carry similar 
weight in intemreh ng the mlmmum 
rommands of t ile fourteenth amendment. 
Our reading of this dec1s1on is in ac-
cord with recent decisions of other Cir-
cuits. As might be expected, the contin-
uing viability of the EEOC temporary 
disability guidelines following Geduldig 
was drawn into question by a number of 
employers who argued essentially the 
other side of the coin appellants urge 
here; i. e., since differing treatment of 
pregnancy-related disabilities is not in-
vidiously discriminatory for the purposes 
of the equal protection clause, neither 
should it be considered discriminatory 
for the purposes of Title VII. To date, 
this contention has been consirlered by 
the Second, Third, and most recently, the 
Fourth Circuits; all have rejected the 
facile equation of Title VII and the four-
teenth amendment. As the Second Cir-
cuit put it: 
Title VII is legislation of this na-
ture, designed to prohibit a broad 
spectrum of discriminatory evils which 
Congress deemed would have such an 
adverse effect. There is no require-
ment that the discriminatory practices 
forbidden by this statute should be 
limited to practices violative of the 
Equal Protection Clause. Practices 
forbidden by Title VII and the EEOC 
guidelines issued thereunder may, 
nonetheless, be able to survive Equal · 
Protection attack. 
II. Although not necessary to our reliance on 
them, each of these decisions also found the 
EEOC guidelines on treatment of pregnancy 
related disabilities to be a valid interpretation 
of Title VII. 
Communications Workers of America v. 
American T. & T., 2 Cir. 1975, 513 F ..2d 
1024, 1031 (emphasis added). Accord, 
Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 3 Cir. 
1975, 511 F.2d 199, cert. granted, -
U.S. - , 95 S.Ct. 1989, 44 L.Ed.2d 476; 
Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 4 Cir. 
1975, -- F.2d -.1 This is of course 
the crux of our refusal to measure the 
constitutionality of the Georgia bar ex-
amimi.tion by Title VII standards.' 
[7] But because we find no basis for 
holding that a bar examination must be 
professionally validated or that bar ex-
aminers are required to demonstrate the 
unavailability of alternative means of 
measuring professional competence, see 
29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1974), does not mean 
that the "job-relatedness" of an exami-
na tion has no relevance tO its constitu-
tionality. The hallmark of a rational 
classification is not merely that it dj..ffer-
entiates, but that it does so on a ba.sis 
having a fair and substantial relationship 
to the purposes of the classification. 
Reed v. Reed, 1971, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 
251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225. What we do hold, 
however, is that the necessary relation-
ship must be detennined by constitution-
al, not statutory, standards." 
[8, 9] Assuming we find that tradi-
tional methods of equal protection analy-
sis are applicable, appellants alternative-
ly contend that the correct standard of 
review is not the "rational relationship" 
test relied on by the district court, but 
the "compelling state interest" test uti-
lized when state action creates a racial 
or other "suspect classification" or im-
pinges on a judicially-declared "fund&. 
9. Significantly, two of the Circuits on whose 
decisions appellants rely are among the three 
which have refused to equate Title VII and the 
fourteenth amendment in interpreting Gedul-
djg. 
II. See text accompanying note 11, J.nlra. 
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mental interest." The gravamen of 
their argument is that the disproportion-
ate passing rates of black and white ap-
plicants on the examination serve to cre-
ate the classification based on race which 
is needed to trigger strict judicial scruti-
ny. The difficulty with this position, 
however, is that it stands in the face of 
a clear body of Jaw holding that an oth-
erwise legitimate classification does not 
become constitutionally "suspect" simply 
. l>ecause greater numbers of a racial mi-
nority fall in the group disadvantaged by 
the classiilcation. Jefferson v. Hackney, 
1972, 406 U .S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 
L.Ed.2d 285; James v. Valtierra, 1971, 
402 U.S. 137, 91 S.Ct. 1331, 28 L .Ed.2d 
678. Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, supra (preg-
nancy not necessarily a sex-based classi-
fication even though only women may 
become pregnant). 
James, for example, concerned the 
constitutionality of a California constitu-
tional provision which required approval 
by referendum for low-income housing 
projects. One of the plaintiffs' primary 
strategies in attacking this constitutional 
provision was to attempt to bring it 
within the ambit of Hunter v. Erickson, 
1969, 393 U.S. 385, 89 S.Ct. 557, 21 
L.Ed.2d 616, which only two years before 
had struck down a city charter amend-
ment requiring voter approval of certain 
antidiscrimination ordinances on the 
ground that the amendment created a 
classification based on race. The James 
plaintiffs argued, successfully at the 
three-judge court level, that the Califor-
nia provision likewise created a racial 
classification because of the high statisti-
cal correlation between the poor and ra-
cial minorities. The Supreme Court, 
however, rejected the analogy and re-
versed, stating: 
Unlike [Hunter], it cannot be said 
that California's Article XXXIV rests 
on "distinctions based on race." ld., at 
391, 89 S.Ct. (557] at 561. The Article 
requires referendum approval for any 
low-rent public housing project, not 
only for projects which will be occu-
pied by a racial minority. And the 
record here would not support any 
claim that a law see mingly neutral on 
its fact is in fact aimed at a racial 
minority. Cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 
364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L .Ed.2d 
110 (1960). The present case could be 
affirmed only by extending Hunter, 
and this we decline to do. 
402 U.S. at 141, 91 S.Ct. at 1333. 
Likewise, in Jefferson v. Hackney, su-
pra, the Court brushed aside the "naked 
statistical argument'' that it was uncon-
stitutional to fund an AFDC program at 
a lower percentage of recognized need 
than other categories of assistance be-
cause of the higher percentage of minor-
ity recipients in the AFDC category with 
the observation that 
[t]he acceptance of appellants' consti-
tutional theory would render suspect 
each difference in treatment among 
the grant classes, however lacking in 
racial motivation and however other-
wise rational the treatment might be. 
Few legislative efforts to deal with 
the difficult problems posed by current 
welfare programs could survive such 
scrutiny, ~nd we do not find it re-
quired by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
406 U.S. at 548-49, 92 S.Ct. at 1732. 
Appellants seek to avoid the thrust of 
these decisions by arguing that they are 
distinguishable as "social welfare" deci-
sions. Noting that the Supreme Court 
has frequently held that states are to be 
allowed greater latitude in formulating 
economic and social welfare policy than 
in other areas, Geduldig, supra, 417 U.S. 
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Iiams, 1970, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87, 90 
S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 they remind 
us that the right to practice law in Geor-
gia is not a resource which the state may 
-either conserve or allocate. However, 
this purported distinction misses the 
point. The difference between economic 
and social welfare cases and others lies 
in the precision with which the state is 
required to draw classifications in seek-
ing to achieve its objectives,. and not in 
the amount of adverse impact on minori-
ty groups which is permissible before an 
otherwise legitimate classification be-
comes constitutionally "suspect." 
Thus, for example, a state may consti-
Pitionally presume that widows are more 
ill need of financial assistance than wid-
owers when legislating a property tax 
exemption, Kahn v. Shevin, 1974, 416 
U.S. 351, 94 S.Ct. 1734, 40 L.Ed.2d 189, 
or that AFDC recipients require a lower 
percentage of need than those in other 
categories of assistance, Jefferson v. 
Hackney, supra, despite the fact that 
these classifications are demonstrably 
both over- and underinclusive; however, 
a state may not similarly assume that 
men make better estate administrators 
than women in the sole interest of elimi-
nating a class of contests for letters of 
administration. Reed v. Reed, supra. 
But, no one would seriously contend that 
any economic resource, however, scarce, 
could be conserved by denying its bene-
fits outright to a racial or other suspect 
minority. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 
1969, 3W U.S. 618, 633, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 
1330, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 ("The saving of 
welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise 
invidious classification.") However, 
since Georgia bar examinees are not 
judged on the basis of broad generaliza-
tions, but rather on the basis of individu-
alized determinations of whether each 
applicant possesses the minimal compe-
tence required to practice law, the "so-
cial welfare" distinction simply has no 
significance in this case. 
[10] The foregoing of course does not 
mean that any facially neutral method 
of classification automatically escapes 
more than minimal judicial scrutiny. An 
apparently neutral scheme may be mere-
ly a subterfuge for invidious discrimina-
tion, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 1960, 364 ' 
U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110, or 
may be discriminatorily applied, Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins, 1886, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 
1064, 30 L.Ed. 220. Moreover, in appro-
priate cases this Court has held that sta-
tistical evidence of disparate racial im-
pact alone may establish a prima facie 
case of racial discrimination, shifting to 
the defendant the burden of demonstrat-
ing that invidious discrimination was not 
among the reasons for his actions. Com-
pare Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 5 
Cir. 1971, 444 F.2d 687 with Robinson v. 
City of Dallas, 5 Cir. 1975, 514 F.2d 1Z71 
[1975]. However, we need not decide if 
this is a case where "statistics 
tell much, and Courts listen," Alabama v. 
United States, 5 Cir. 1962, 304 F.2d 583, 
586, aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 37, 83 
S.Ct. 145, 9 L.Ed.2d 112, because of our 
prior conclusion that appellees have 
carried their burden under Fed.R.Civ.P. 
56 of demonstrating the absence of any 
genuine issue of material fact regarding 
intentional racial discrimination. Thus, 
even were we to assume that the burden 
of proof has shifted, it must also be 
deemed to have been met. 
Since the Georgia bar examination 
does not establish a constitutionally sus-
pect racial classification and no claim is 
made that a fundamental interest is. in-
volved, there is no legal basis for apply-
ing the compelling state interest test and 
the proper standard of review becomes 
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the distOct court. Appellants nonethe-
less urge that the district court, which 
relied mainly on Schware v. Board of 
Examiners, 1957, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 
752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 as authority for its 
standard of review, erred in failing to 
apply what they term the somewhat 
stricter burden of rationality exemplified 
by more recent decisions such as Reed v. 
Reed, supra, on the ground that the ra-
cial discrimination involved in this case is 
even more highly suspect than the gen-
der-based discrimination in Reed. 
Appellants' argument for invoking 
Reed is, of course, specious. As the Su-
preme Court succinctly stated in Jeffer-
son, supra, 406 U.S. 535, 547, 92 S.Ct. 
1724, 1732: "The standard of judicial re-
view is not altered because of appellant's 
unproved allegations of racial discrimina-
tion." This is not to say that Reed has 
no relevance to this appeal; however, its 
significance is of little comfort to appel-
lants. In our view, Reed and related 
decisions such as Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 1973, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 
L.Ed.2d 583, serve to reemphasize the 
desirability and relative relationality, at 
least outside the area of economic and 
social welfare programs, of classifica-
tions which act directly upon the quality 
they purport to measure as compared to 
classifications which attempt to achieve 
their intended objectives through indi-
rection, often by the use of ill-fitting 
and stereotyped generalizations. Since, 
as we have previously noted, the Georgia 
bar examination provides an individual, 
anonymous determination of each appli-
cant's present competence to practice 
law, it comports with this aspect of the 
teaching of Reed and its progeny. Ac-
cordingly, the existence of these inter-
vening decisions in no way denigrates 
the district court's reliance on the Su-
preme Court's earlier statement in 
Schware, supra, 353 U.S. 232, 239, 77 
S.Ct. 752, 756, 1 · L.Ed.2d 796, th11t "(a] 
state can require high standards of qual-
ification such as good moral chara<:ter or 
proficiency in its law, before it admits 
an applicant to the bar, but any qualifi-
cation must have a rational connection 
with the applicant's fitness or capacity 
to practice law," as its source of authori-
ty for the appropriate standard of re-
view. 
Appellant's final argument regarding 
inherent discrimination is that, even if 
we should find the district court adopted 
the correct standard of review, it im~ 
properly resolved disputed issues of fact 
in reaching its conclusion that the bar 
examination possesses a rational connec-
tion with an applicant's fitness to prac-
tice law. This contention is simply de-
void of merit. 
~11, 12] Appellants concede, as they 1 
must, that the state has a legitimate and I 
substantial interest in excluding from 
the practice of law those persons who do 
not meet its standards of minimal com- j 
petence and that the Georgia examina-
tion, as presently constituted, tests skills 
and knowledge which have a "logical, 
apparent relationship" to those necessary 
to the practice of law. 
While appellants valiantly argue oth-
erwise, these facts are sufficient in 
themselves to establish the rationality of 
the bar examination in the constitutional 
sense. If a state has the right to insist 
on a minimum standard of legal compe-
tence as a condition of licensure, it 
would seem to follow a fortiori that it 
may require a demonstration of such 
competence in an examination designed 
to test the fundamental ability to recog· 
nize and deal with legal principles. 
Another important indicium of ration-
ality is that the Georgia bar examination 
satisfies the two criteria of a rational 
-- !Sa 
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examination we identified in Annstead 
v. Starkville Municipal Separate School 
Dist., 5 Cir. 1972, 461 F.2d 276, in which 
we held the Graduate Record Examina-
tion to be an unconstitutional method for 
selecting primary and secondary school 
teachers. There we suggested that a ra-
tionally supportable examination should 
1) be designed for the purpose for which 
it is being used, and 2) utilize a cutoff 
BCOre related ·to the quality the examina-
tion purports to measure. The Georgia 
bar examination meets both qualifica-
tions. Both the essay and MBE portions 
of the examination are designed solely to 
assesa the legal competence of bar exam-
inees; and while the minimum passing 
score of 70 has no significance standing 
alone, it represents the examiners' con-
sidered judgments as to "minimal compe-
tence required to practice law," the pre-
cise quality the examination attempts to 
measure.11 
[13] The disputed fact issues whJCh 
appellants claim necessitate a trial, such 
as whether the bar examination covers a 
sufficiently broad domain of subject 
matter or tests an adequate range of 
legal skills, are at botton only claims 
that the examination could be improved. 
While the difference between minimal 
and strict scrutiny is necessarily a mat-
ter of degree, this argument overlooks 
one of the most fundamental distinctions 
between the two standards of review-
the relevance of the availability of alter-
native means. While a party defending 
a classification subject to strict judicial 
scrutiny must demonstrate that the state 
has no other available alternative which 
impinges less on the protected interest 
II. tke also Baker v. Columbus Municipal Sep· 
arate School Dist., 5 Cir. 1972, 462 F.2d 1112, 
1114-15. While appellants suggest that there 
Is language in Baker which indicates that strict 
scrutiny is generally applicable to qualifying 
involved, see, e. g., Shelton v. Tucker, 
1960, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 
L.Ed.2d 231, the focus of the rational 
relationship test is not whether the state 
has superior means available to accom-
plish its objectives, but whether the 
means it has chosen is a reasonable one. 
Viewed from this perspective, appellants' 
asserted "fact issues" are simply not ma-
terial. 
[14, 15] The same observation applies 
to appellants' contentions that the bar 
examination is irrationally administered 
because its outcome depends so heavily 
on the subjective grading judgments of 
the examiners. Since subjective, as op-
posed to objective, grading is a necessary 
corollary. to the administration of essay-
type questions, an attack on subjective 
grading per se must perforce include the 
allegation that the use of essay examina-
tions is itself irrational. This contention 
has uniformly been rejected by the 
courts which have considered it, for rea-
sons succinctly articulated in an unre-
ported opinion granting partial summary 
judgment in one of the consolidated ac-
tions comprising this appeal. There the 
court said: 
The relevant question must then be 
whether the passing of an examination 
made up of subjective, essay-type 
questions has a rational connection 
with the applicant's ability to practice 
law in the State of Georgia. It is 
beyond question that it does. While 
plaintiff would apparently favor a 
more objective type of examination, 
much of an attorney's actual work 
once admitted into practice involves 
the analysis of complicated fact situa-
examinations, the basis of our holding there 
was the affirmance of an explicit finding of 
purposeful racial discrimination. For this rea-
son, the compelling state interest test was the 
appropriate standard of review m Baker. 
--
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tiona and the application thereto of ab-
stract legal principles. Both in legal 
practice and with these essay-type 
questions, recognition of the legal 
problem presented and well-reasoned 
explication of the relevant considera-
tions is of utmost importance. 
Banks v. Miller, Civil No. 15876 (N.D.Ga., 
August 11, 1972) (footnote omitted). Ac-
cord, Whitfield v. Illinois Board of Law 
Examiners, 7 Cir. 1974, 504 F.2d 474, 
477; Feldman v. State Board of Law 
Examiners, 8 Cir. 1971, 438 F.2d 699, 
703; Chaney v. State Bar of California, 
9 Cir. 1967, 386 F .2d 962, 964, cert. de-
nied, 1968, 390 U .S. 1011, 88 S.Ct. 1262, 
20 L.Ed.2d 162. Appellants' further ar-
guments that the examiners should uni-
formly be required to use model answers 
and pre-determined standards in grading 
are again merely suggestions for im-
provement, and do not raise a fact issue 
as to whether the examination itself is 
rational. 
[16] Finally, we flatly reject appel-
lants' contentions that the Board's prac-
tice of regrading failing papers falling 
close to the passing mark, or of compar-
ing examination results with law school 
records as an informal check on the ex-
aminers' performance, is evidence of the 
irrationality of the examination. We 
fully agree with the statement in appel-
lees' brief that "[t]he Constitution does 
not require a perfect test nor should it 
require the examiners to act as if the 
test were perfect." Indeed, it is curious 
logic to condemn the examiners for uti-
lizing practices designed to recognize the 
inherent limitations of testing and for 
attempting to give the benefit of the 
doubt to applicants who may have been 
adversely affected by those limitations. 
Similarly, we see no infirmity in the fact 
that the standards for determining 
which papers are to be regraded are not 
fixed and immutable and may de~nd in 
part upon the exercise of an examiner's 
discretion. 
[17, 18] Nor do we find it irrational 
for the examiners to compare examina-
tion results with law school records as 
one informal, after-the-fact means of 
judging the quality of the examination. 
Since Georgia as well as other states re-
quires graduation from law school or its 
equivalent as a prerequisite to taking 
the bar examination, a requirement 
which appellants do not challenge here, 
it is certainly reasonable to assume that 
legal training is highly instrumental in 
developing the qualities that comprise 
"minimal competence to practice law" 
and that the overall performance of 
graduates of various institutions bears 
some logical relevance to how well the 
examination is measuring these qualities. 
The fact remains, of course, that each 
applicant's examination is graded. with-
out knowledge of his particular legal 
background. Accordingly, we have no 
hesitancy in affirming the district court's 
holding that the Georgia bar examina-
tion "has a rational relationship to an 
applicant's fitness to practice law. 
" 
III. DUE PROCESS REVIEW 
[19] In addition to the equal protec-
tion claims we have previously discussed, 
appellants also contend that the failure 
to provide any procedure for review of a 
failing grade at the behest of the exami-
nee constitutes a denial of due process of 
law. The district court's view was that 
such review is not constitutionally re-
quired, primarily because an unqualified 
right to retake the examination at its 
next regularly scheduled administration 
both satisfies the purposes of a hearing 
and affords it protection. We agree. 
- 17a 
ITLER v. VICKERY 7403 
The safeguards of the due process 
clause are of course available to a failing 
bar applicant. As the Supreme Court 
stated in Schware, supra: 
A State cannot exclude a person 
from the practice of law or from any 
other occupation in a manner or for 
reasons that contravene the Due Proc-
ess or Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
535 U.S. at 238---39, 77 S.Ct. at 756. 
[20] While the opportunity to be 
heard is generally considered a funda-
mental component of due process, en-
titlement to a hearing does not automat-
ically flow from a finding that procedur-
al due process is applicable. See, e. g ., 
N9rth American Cold Storage Co. v. Chi-
cago, 1908, 211 U.S. 306, 29 S.Ct. 101, 53 
L.Ed.. 195. As the Supreme Court ob-
served in Hannah v. · Larche, 1960, 363 
U.S. 420, 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 1515, 4 
L.Ed..2d 1307: 
"Due process" is an elusive concept. 
Ita exact boundaries are undefinable, 
and its content varies according to spe-
cific factual contexts. 
Whether the Constitution requires that 
a particular right obtain in a specific 
proceeding depends upon a complexity 
of factors. The nature of the alleged 
right involved, the nature of the pro-
ceeding, and the possible burden on 
that proceeding, are all considerations 
which must be taken into account. 
[21] In the first instance, whether 
due process requires a particular proce-
dure in a given situation must be deter-
mined by balancing the individual's in-
terest in avoiding the loss which lack of 
the procedure inflicts upon him against 
the interests which the government 
seeks to advance by denying it. Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 1970, 397 U.S. 254, 262--63, 
90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed..2d 287. In argu-
ing that this balance should be struck in 
favor of allowing a failing bar examinee 
a hearing, appellants rely heavily on an 
applicant's undoubted interest in pursu-
ing his chosen profession. But such re-
liance misses the mark. While this in· 
terest is admittedly a weighty one in 
determining whether due process protec-
tions are applicable, see Atlanta Attrac-
tions, Inc. v. Massell, N.D.Ga.1971, 332 
F.Supp. 914, aff'd, 5 Cir. 1972, 463 F .2d 
449, it militates similarly in favor of a 
hearing only if hearings are demonstra-
bly more efficacious means of safeguard-
ing that interest than the unqualified 
right of reexamination which Georgia 
currently provides. We think they are 
not. 
First, since regularly scheduled exami-
nations are held every six months, and 
each administration of the examination 
produces scores of unsuccessful appli-
cants who would be entitled to hearings, 
we think it unlikely that providing a 
hearing would afford significantly quick-
er relief to an erroneously failed appli-
cant than would the right to retake the 
examination at its next administration. 
Second, we think it likewise unlikely 
that a hearing would be significantly 
more effective in exposing grading er-
rors than would reexamination. At a 
hearing, the issue of course would not be 
whether the examiner had given an ap-
plicant the "correct" grade, but rather 
whether either a mechanical error had 
been made in computing the grade or 
the grade given by the examiner was 
arbitrary, capricious, and without foun-
dation. Since "it is not to be presumed 
that powers conferred upon the adminis-
trative boards will be exercised arbitrari-
ly," Douglas v. Noble, 1923, 261 U.S. 165, 
170, 43 S.Ct. 303, 305, 67 L.Ed. 590, we 
may presume that such errors are infre-
quent. Even making the generous as-
- raa -
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sumption that one out of every hundred 
applicants who take the examination fail 
when they should have passed due to 
arbitrary grading, the probability that 
the same individual would be the victim 
of error after two ~xaminations is lit-
erally one in a million..IZ Since the hear-
ing process is itself susceptible to error, 
we see little advantage to it on this 
score. 
The one area in which a hearing would 
appear to be a superior remedy to reexa-
mination is in removing whatever stigma 
may attach to an individual from having 
previously failed the bar examination in 
the rare case where the failure was un-
justified. Such undeserved stigma, how-
ever, is not only rare but far removed 
factually from that occasioned by the 
public "posting'~ as a drunkard which 
was involved in Wisconsin v. Constanti-
neau, 1971, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, ?:1 
L.Ed.2d 515; but more important, it also 
presents entirely· different issues than 
those involved when an individual is de-
nied admission to the bar on the ground 
of moral unfitness. See Willner Y. Com-
mittee on Character and Fitness, . 1963, 
373 U.S. 96, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 10 L.Ed.2d 
224. While an adverse determination on 
character and fitness tends to exert a 
continuing detrimental effect on an indi-
vidual's opportunity to be admitted to 
practice, unless and until rebutted, fail-
ure on a bar examination does not stig-
matize an individual as "incompetent," 
but merely indicates that he did not 
demonstrate minimal competence on a 
particular examination. Upon reexami-
nation, such an individual is entitled to 
have his paper graded by the same stan-
dards as those of everyone else, and if he 
passes, to be admitted on precisely the 
same basis as an applicant who had not 
previously taken the examination. For 
these reasons, we consider the "liberty 
interest" a failing examinee has at stake 
to be a minor, if not a non~xistent one. 
Cf. SirruJ v. Fox, 5 Cir. 1974, 505 F.2d 
857, 862-64 (en bane). 
In contrast, we find the interests 
which the state seeks to advance by sub-
stituting reexamination for a hearing to 
be substantial. The most important of 
these interests is, of course, avoidance of 
the administrative burden which a hear- · 
ing requirement would entail. Since, as 
we have noted, scores of applicants fail 
the Georgia bar examination each time it 
is given, and all examiners are involved 
in the grading of each paper, the result 
of requiring a hearing would be the im-
position of what the Seventh Circuit has 
described as "an intolerable burden upon 
the bar examiners," Whitfield v. Illinois 
Board of Bar ·Examiners, 7 Cir. 1974, 
504 F.2d 474, 478, especially when one 
considers that bar examiners are not 
full-time administrators but practicing 
attorneys. While such administrative 
concerns are not in themselves control-
ling, they are certainly relevant, Richard-
son v. Perales, 1971, 402 U.S. 389, 406, 91 
S.Ct. 1420, 28 S.Ct. 842, and become par-
ticularly so when the gains to be realized 
through the imposition of an additional 
administrative burden are as minimal as 
they are here. Moreover, as Whitfield, 
supra, has observed, the initiation of a 
hearing requirement as a supplement to, 
rather than as a substitute for, the right 
of reexamination (as we are certain ap-
pellants view their due process claim) 
might result in unfair disadvantage to 
those applicants taking the examination · 
for the first time. 
12. See Comment, Review of Failing Bar Examinations: Does ReeXAmination Satisfy Due Process?, 
52 Bos.U.LRev. 286, 301 N. 115. 
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Finally, in weighing the "complexity 
of factors" which serve to shape the con-
tours of the process which is due here, 
we do not write on a clean slate. The 
precise issue before us has been con-
sidered squarely by one Circuit, Whit-
field, supra. 504 F.2d 474, 477- 79; infer-
entially by another, Chaney v. State Bar 
of California, 9 Cir. 1967, 386 F .2d 962, 
967, cert. denied, 1968, 390 U.S. 1011, 88 
S.Ct. 1262, 20 L.Ed.2d 162; and in dic-
tum by a third, Feldman v. State Board 
of Law Examiners, 8 Cir. 1971, 438 F.2d 
699, 703 n. 6. All have concluded, as 
have we, that a hearing is not required. 
These decisions, which we consider sound 
and well-reasoned, reinforce our convic-
tion that the balance we have struck is 
the proper one. 
Accordingly, since the record reveals 
no disputed issues of material fact and 
the applicable principles of law clearly 
demonstrate that appellees are entitled 
to prevail, the district court's award of 
summary judgment to appellees is 
Affirmed. 
ADAMS, Circuit Judge (dissenting): 
Since I believe the majority decision 
rests upon a tenuous resolution of pivot-
al factual issues in a troublesome area of 
the law where residual doubts at this 
stage of the proceedings should be re-
aolved in favor of the plaintiffs, I must, 
with deference to the comprehensive 
opinion of the majority, dissent. 
a. 
My dissent is based in large measure 
on the nature of the uncontradicted facts 
1. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: 
"nor shall any State deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws."' 
which plaintiffs have adva.r.ced to estab-
lish a case of racial discrimination viola-
. tive of the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment.1 
The central focus of this litigation is 
that black applicants as a class have for 
a period of years experienced a 'severely 
disproportionate number of failing marks 
on the Georgia bar examination. As the 
majority opinion candidly concede.'!, this 
situation reached a nadir in July, 1972, 
when each of the 40 black applicants 
failed; and continued in February and 
July, 1973, when more than one-half the 
black applicants were unsuccessful, com-
pared to a failure rate of one-fourth to 
one-third among white examinees. 
b. 
The administration of a state policy 
that is neutral on its fact but which re-
sults in unequal application to those enti-
tled to be treated alike is not in itself a 
denial of equal protection. Rather, it 
must be demonstrated that there is 
present an element of purposeful dis-
crimination. Such purposeful discrimi-
nation, however, may be evidenced by a 
systematic, long-eontinued pattern of un-
equal results.2 
A colorable case of purposeful racial 
discrimination is set forth where SU3-
tained de facto discrimination is shown 
together with the absence of an investi-
gation, or indeed any effort, by the ad-
ministrators of the state program in 
question to ascertain whether the seem-
ingly purposeful discrimination is inten-
tional in fact or is explainable by the 
circumstances.3 This is so because a pre-
2. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8-9, 64 S.Ct, 
397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1943). 
3. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404, 62 S.Ct. 
1159, 86 J-.Ed. 1559 (1942); Hawkins v. Town 
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sumption of racial inferiority is simply 
not permissible.• 
c. 
Bridgeport Guard. Inc. v. Members of 
Bridgeport Civil Service Comm'n 5 was a 
suit by nearly all the black policemen of 
the City of Bridgeport who had not 
passed a particular civil service examina-
tion. The Second Circuit held that the 
defendants had a heavy burden to meet 
the plaintiffs' prima facie case of invidi-
ous discrimination in view of a practice 
that resulted in a disparity of substantial 
magnitude between the hiring of whites 
and blacks. This Court has stated that 
"(w]henever the effect of a law or policy 
(use by school district of a 1,000 cut-off 
score in the National Teachers E xamina-
tion as a condition of e mployment] pro-
duces a [significant] racial 
distortion it is subject to strict 
scrutiny."' 
Based on a fair reading of the plead-
ings and the depositions here--with all 
inferences resolved in favor of the plain-
tiffs, as required on summary judg-
ment-it would appear that the defend-
ants have not met their burden of dis-
proving purposeful discrimination in the 
application of the Georgia bar examina-
tion. 
The plaintiffs have raised the question 
whether black examinees, although ini-
tially anonymous, can be racially identi-
fied by graders of the essay portion of 
modified en bane on other grounds, 461 F.2d 
1171 (1972); see Armstead ·v. Starkville Mu· 
nicipal Separate School Dist., 461 F.2d 276, 
279--280 (5 Cir. 1972). 
4. Brown v. Allen, 34-t U.S. 443, 471, 73 S.Ct. 
397, 97 LEd. 469 (1953). 
L 482 F.2d 1333, 1337 (2d Cir. 1973). 
I. Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate 
School District, 462 F .2d 1112, 1114 (5 Cir. 
1972). 
the examination because of the use of 
"Black English." As the majority proJr 
erly points out, proof of identification of 
bar examinees by race may be difficult. 
However, the difficulty of proof does not 
eliminate its possibility. Surely such dif-
ficulty, without more, should not bar, in 
the context of this case, affording the 
plaintiffs the opportunity of offering 
any such evidence at trial. 
In addition, the use of the objective 
MBE in combination with the essay ex-
amination raises a question of the 
weight accorded each when the exarni?-
ers come to the point of ascertaining 
final .grades. Also, the selection of cut-
off scores, especially when such selection 
is not subject to review, may be arbi-
trary. The legality of such decisions 
may not properly be resolved by mere 
reference to the good faith judgment of 
the bar examiners.7 
d. 
The reliance by the district court and 
the majority on Schware v. Board of Bar 
Examiners 8 would appear to be mis-
placed. &hware dealt with the case of 
a single, white law school graduate de-
nied the right to take the New Mexico 
bar examination on the ground that he 
was "morally unfit." The Supreme 
Court decided that the New Mexico bar 
examiners did not have a rational basis 
for denying the plaintiff that right. The 
Court was not called upon to consider 
7. ld. at 1114. I do not mean by this statement 
to impugn the integrity of the examiners. 
Rather, I suggest only that it is not appropri-
ate to foreclose an attempt by plaintiffs to 
establish this fact. 
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the question whether more than a ra-
tional basis for denying admission to the 
bar examination to Schware was re-
quired. 
e. 
The EEOC guidelines for employment 
testing •. and the principles enunciated in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 10-both of 
which require a validation of a suspect 
employment test-are at least persuasive 
as to the criteria to be applied to the 
Georgia bar examination under the facts 
of this case. As plaintiffs point out, the 
examination here, although not adminis-
tered by an "employer" for the purpose 
of hiring, is for all practical purposes an 
'employment test. The applicant who 
fails it may not, in any respect, be em-
ployed to practice law within the state. 
Moreover, the philosophy underlying 
the Civil Rights Act would appear to 
encompass this type of examination. As 
the Supreme Court pointed out in 
Griggs : "Under the Act, practices, pro-
cedures, or tests neutral on their face, 
and even neutral in terms c:J! intent, can-
not be maintained if they operate to 
'freeze' the status quo of prior discrimi-
natory employment practices." 11 
The majority declares that Allen v. 
Mobile 12 does not permit the Griggs 
standard to be applied in an area other 
than that to which the Civil Rights Act 
is expressly directed. In Allen this 
Court, without referring to Griggs or the 
EEOC guidelines, affirmed per curiam 
the decision of the district court judge, 
1. Interpreting and implementing Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e. 
11. 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 
(1971). 
11. ld. at 430, 91 S.Ct. at 853. 
12. 466 F.2d 122 (5 Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 
U.S. 909, 93 S.Ct. 2292, 36 L.Ed.2d 975 (1973). 
reached after trial, that an alleged dis-
criminatory written test used for pro-
moting police officers was reasonably or 
rationally job-related. Judge Goldberg 
dissented on the ground that the distt-ict 
court, and the majority in affirming the 
district court, had misconstrued the stan-
dard Griggs required.U Neither the per 
curiam affirmance of the trial court's 
holding in itself nor the per curiam as 
clarified by the dissent warrants a rejec-
tion out of hand of any utilization what-
ever of either the Griggs' standard or 
the EEOC guidelines. 
f. 
Nor do I believe that the recently de-
cided Geduldig v. Aiello,14 relied on by 
the majority, is in any way controlling. 
The facts and governing law of Geduldig 
are substantially distinguishable from 
those here. The California unemploy-
ment compensation disability fund, 
which is supplementary to the state's 
workmen's compensation program; ex-
. eludes from its coverage disabilities re-
sulting from ·normal pregnancy and 
childbirth. The Supreme Court, in re-
viewing the exclusion of pregnancy and 
childbirth coverage, did not apply EEOC 
directives on pregnancy because no in-
vidious discrimination was perceived. A 
state social welfare program necessarily 
must draw a line somewhere, the Su-
preme Court stated. The exclusion of 
one disability was not suspect where oth-
er comparable disabilities were also ex-
cluded.15 The particular disability was 
13. ld. at 126. 
14. 417 U.S. 484, 94 S.Ct. 2485, 41 L.Ed.2d 256 
(1974). 
15. Compare James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 
91 S.Ct. 1331, 28 L.Ed.2d 678 (1971) with 
Hunter v . Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 89 S.Ct. 557, 
21 L.Ed.2d 616 (1969). 
- 22a -
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sex-related but the decision to exclude it 
from ~verage, said the Supreme Court, 
was not predicated on sex but on the 
limited financial resources available in 
the compensation fund. Such reasoning 
is not apposite here. 
g. 
Plaintiffs in this case have established 
what amounts to an exclusion from job 
opportunities of a disproportionate num-
ber of blacks. These facts call for a 
stricter standard of review than the 
standard the majority . approves today. 
Of even more significance, in a case of 
this importance where one of the key 
factors in determining illegality will be 
the evaluation of motive, it seems partic-
ularly inappropriate to employ the device 
of summary judgment.1' Summary 
judgment may be used only when no 
genuine issues of fact remain unresolved. 
For all the reasons pointed out above, 
I would reverse the grant of summary 
judgment and remand the case to the 
district court for a trial on the merits. 
IS. PoDer v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 LEd.2d 458 
(1962) . . 
Adm. Office, U.S. Courta-West Publishing Company, Saint Paul, Minn. 
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1. SUMMARY : This case involves the legality of a written entrance 
examination administered to all D. C. police force_ ';£Plicants. Judge Gesell in 
~ 
1972 upheld the test. A divided CA DC in 1975 reversed. D. C. officials now seek 
cert. 
2. FACTS: All D. C. police applicants are required to take an entrance 
~· 
V examination known as Test 21. This exam, consisting of 80 multiple choice 
questions, was designed by the Civil Service Commission for general use in the 
'· ; 
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federal service to measure verbal ability. To qualify for the force, police 
aspirants must correctly answer 40 of the 80 questions. The operation of the test 
has not been marked by minority success. Between 1968 and 1971, 57o/o of black 
applicants failed the test, whereas white applicants experienced a much lower --
failure rate of 13o/o. 
At the same time that Test 21 was being administered, D. C. officials were 
mounting vigorous recruitment efforts aimed at minority applicants. Between 
August 1969 and July 1972, 44o/o of incoming police recruits were black. During 
the period when resps failed Test 21 iE, 1970, over 50o/o of incoming policemen were 
... ~~~~ .... .. "---"""" ...... 
black. The evidence showed that substantial numbers of applicants who successfully 
pas sed the test, both black and white, failed to report for duty. 
Upon acceptance, a recruit's sucfes s was assured. The department 
religiously followed the practice of not failing any recruits who had been accepted 
for the training program. Additional instruction and other dispensatio~ ... were used 
to push everyone through the school with passing marks. ~ ' 
After failing Test 21, resps intervened in an ongoing class action, alleging 
that D. C. 's utilization of the test constituted an unlawful employment practice. 
D. C. officials argued that the test was a reliable indicator of applicants' performance 
II "' 
in the intensive police training program, the Recruit School. To substantiate their 
claim, petrs introduced a validation study by the Commission in 196 7, which 
indicated a ~ect correlation between success on Test 21 arrl subsequent per-.....__.. ............... 
formance on tests in Recruit School. The police department, however, could not 
show correlations between the test and subsequent job performance. 
,. 
- 3 -
Judge Gesell granted res ps' motion for summary judgment. He admitted 
that the raw data showed a disproportionate number of blacks failing Test 21 and 
that the number of black police officers, although substantial, was not proportionate 
to the city's population mix. This showing, "while minimal, 11 sufficed to shift the 
"burden of the inquiry" to the department. Petn, at 48a. Judge Gesell then 
emphasized: (1) that the department had vigorously recruited black policemen; 
(2) that the evidence showed the need for considerable verbal skills both in the 
Recruit School and on the job; and (3) that many blacks, numbering in the hundred , 
pas sed Test 21 but for other reasons failed to report for duty . 
.......___ - ---- ----
A divided CA DC reversed. The majority held that the test indisputably had 
a racially disproportionate impact, since the failure rate among blacks was more 
than four times that of whites. Given this effect, the department's vigorous 
rnino,rity recruitment policies were irrelevant, because under Griggs v. Duke 
·' 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, an employer's innocent motives were not a relevant 
criterion. Due to the disproportionate racial impact, a "heavy burden" rested on 
petrs to prove that the test bears a demonstrable relationship to suc~es sful job 
performance. The majority admitted for purposes of argument that "Test 21 is 
predictive of further progress in Recruit School. 11 Petn, at 12a-13a. But this 
correlation did not prove job-relatedness. First, no relationship was shown 
between test scores and trainability, since the department did not prove that 
recruits with lower scores were harder to train, and since no persons who fail 
the test are admitted to Recruit School. Second, no correlation was reflected 
between both Recruit School scores and Test 21 scores and examinees' subsequent 
- 4 -
Judge Robb dissented. Admitting that his was a "common sense" approach, 
he primarily took issue with the majority's unstated conclusion that verbal ability 
is unrelat e d to a policeman's job. He concluded that Test 21 on its face is a fair 
test of recruit ability. 
3. CONTENTIONS : P etrs contend that the CA majority misapplied Griggs, 
by finding invalidity on the basis of minority pass-fail data alone, despite a 
"favorable" correlation between minority recruitment percentages and minority 
population percentages. Resps say that the majority correctly followed this 
Court's guidance. An adverse racial impact was shown, thus the burden of proof 
shifted to petrs, who did not prove that Test 21 predicted trainability. 
4. DISCUSSION: The majority's result is arguably consistent with some of 
Griggs' sweeping language prohibiting any employment practice which cannot be 
shown to be related to job performance if an adverse racial impact results. But 
Griggs has plainly been cut fro_El _its roots, a setting where tests, albeit facially 
............... ~-----...... ~~ 
neutral, operated to freeze the vestiges of prior discriminatory practices. 401 U.S., 
at 430. Duke Power's employment tests at is sue in that case were neither 
designed nor intended to measure any necessary job skill, a far cry from the 
present practice, since everyone seems to admit that verbal skills are job-related 
in nature. Moreover, job correlation has in fact been established to an extent in 
!M+ t>\1\ce 
Q,\\ rec.r-.\-b this case. The Commission's validity study shows a clear correlation between -Q.'letN~\l 
f"~ttcl) vre? high Test 21 scores and high marks on Recruit School exams. It hardly strains 
S"*'t\~L.... ~ 
"~ credulity to conclude that part of "job performance" is successful participation in 
~ ~ and completion of Recruit School, although it must be added that the Recruit School 
~9~ exams have not themselves been judicially analyzed. Despite this nexus, theCA 
OV\ ~ $ C>. ~-ptc.A-
of '',io\o ~~~caMC.e'• 
\s rtA~ \\~k.A. 
.. 
- 5 -
majority disingenuously concluded that Recruit School success of applicants who 
fail Test 21 cannot be divined, because the police department rejects unsuccessful 
examinees. That conclusion is, of course, self- evident, and permitting it legal 
significance operates to place an unprovable burden on employers who do not 
hire a few unsuccessful examinees to provide a sample pool for comparison purposes. 
On the other hand, the most telling argument in favor of the result below is 
* that E2. correlation could be shown between Test 21 scores and post-Recruit School 
job performance. The issue therefore becomes whether a lesser showing of job-
relatedness, i.e., that entrance test scores predict performance on training school 
(exams, is sufficient when successful efforts are concurrently underway to recruit 
minority members. 
There is a res pons e. 
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TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Chris Whitman DATE: February 23, 1976 
No. 74-1492 Washington v. Davis 
I would apply straight equal protection analysis 
to this case and reverse and remand. If standards derived 
from Title VII cases are applied, I would affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals (!.~., remand for determination 
of appropriate remedy). 
I. What Standards Should Be Used? 
This case was brought under the Equal Protection 
Clause and § 1981. In reviewing such a case, the Court must 
first decide the question, discussed in my memo on No. 74-768, 
~,.....,~p"':C'g 
Brown v. General Services Administration (to be argued next 
week), whether§ 1981 is a waiver of sovereign immunity 
:wa,...-., ._.,..-.., ~ .. ..... 24 
applicable to the federal government. As I said there, I 
,......., -~._. .-.._. w::"' ,.-.. 
am inclined to think that it is. 
This problem aside, there is the further question 
whether the court's inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause 
is identical to that required by cases, such as Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), decided under Title VII. 
2. 
Both parties - and the courts below - assumed 
· - ( n11po.cl? jop - re.la.,~c\ ~) -
t~at the i~iries ! et _fort!;_ in Griggs "ar~appro§rliate. 
The' issue is not briefed at all. But I am unconvinced. 
It is not surprising that the applicability of Title VII 
standards has been assumed. The lower courts have generally 
made no distinction between Title VII standards and those 
appropriate under the Equal Protection Clause. See,~·~·' 
cases cited in CADC opinion, at 3a n. 2. And this Court, 
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n. 14 
(1973), a Title VII case, cited lower court equal protection 
cases that applied the Griggs standard as support for the 
proposition that employment tests with an exclusionary effect 
on minorities must be shown to be job-related. 
But in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), a 
sex discrimination case, the Court refused to apply strict 
scrutiny unless a classification was explicitly gender-based 
or was a "mere" pretext "designed to effect invidious 
discrimination." 417 U.S. at 496-497 n. 20. An adverse 
"impact" on women as a class was insufficient. Title VII, in 
contrast, explicitly prohibits any employment practice that tends 
to deprive an employee of opportunities because of his or her 
sex. Geduldig makes it clear that, at least where sex "' ~ ................ 
discrimination is involved, t~l Protection Clause _gnd 
«.~ oWr'lCLt!J e~ pro~ffi<l'Y\ "Tau' I 
Title VII are not coextensive. The question before us in this 
~ ~ ~ A 
case is: When racial discrimination is alleged, is discriminatory 
3. 
impact on blacks sufficient to call for the demanding scrutiny 
of the "compelling state interest" test, or must plaintiffs 
demonstrate that the classification is either explicitly 
race-based or a mere pretext before the court will engage in 
strict scrutiny? 
The CA did not rely only on other lower court cases in 
ro..\her -\-~ Ct'd\nO-nj e ~ t'tc \-<..&.em a.na.ttts '"s 
deciding to apply Title VIIJA It also pointed out that, although 
Title VII was not applicable to federal employees at the time 
respondents here intervened, it was made applicable to federal 
1972 (the year of the district court decision). 
{The co~f a_.epeals said that the plaintiffs ''unquestionably ? --- - - ~ 
are entitles;], to_ the benefit of the amendment. II CADC opinion, -... _.......,. - ..__ 
p. 3a n. 2. This is true in that the district court may 
be ~equired to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint to 
allege a cause of action under Title VII. Compare Womack v. 
. 
Lynn, 504 F. 2d 267 (C.A.D.C. 1974). But it does not mean 
that J 
the court of appeals may treat the case as if the complaint 
presented a basis for jurisdiction that was not in fact alleged. 
In this respect, the case differs from those situations in which 
the rule of law governing a given cause of action is modified 
while litigation is in process; in those situations the new 
rule is to be applied without any need for modification of 
the complaint. This case is different. If respondents had 
filed an original action after Title VII became applicable to 
ha.d 
them but failed to allege any cause of action other than equal 
" 
protection and § 1981, the court would not assume that a Title 
VII action was intended. Certainly this would be in the case 
if the action were brought by private employees. As this 
Court said, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 
(1975), § 1981 and Title VII are separate and distinct 'remedies. --
Moreover, if the employees had expressly based their complaint 
upon Title VII they would be required to exhaust the 
administrative remedies incorporated into that statute. It ____ ,.~ ~~ -- -
is not clear that such exhaustion is required before a § 1981 
suit can be brought. See my memo in Brown. 
If Title VII analysis is to be applied in equal 
protection cases, there will be less incentive for employees 
to use Title VII procedures, with their attendant limitations. 
Title VII, in distinction to § 1981, imposes a limitation on 
back pay. Depending on our decisions in Brown and in Chandler v. 
Roudebush (No. 74-1599), also to be argued next week, it may 
also impose a more stringent exhaustion requirement and allow 
only limited judicial review in federal employment discrimination 
cases. 
If the Title VII analysis spelled out in Griggs is not 
to be adopted automatically, we must look to ordinary equal 
protection analysis. In equal protection cases, my cursory 
~~~----------~----
!
review indicates ~scr~i~atory _imp! ct in itself has not been 
sufficient to call for strict scrutiny. Geduldig is not 
the only case that has taken this position. An example in the 
~.JI~c:.-~~i.a~ ~ ~~~~ 
~~~ 
5. 
racial discrimination area is James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 
137 (1971), in which the Court upheld a California constitutional 
requirement that low-rent housing projects be subject to 
approval by referendum. The Court distinguished a case where 
the referendum requirement turned explicitly on the involvement 
of race. It said that the challenged requirement was neutral 
on its face and did not appear to be aimed deliberately at 
a racial minority. 402 U.S. at 140-141. In cases where 
"impact" alone has been found to be sufficient, the Court 
has suggested that the statute or regulation, although neutral 
on its face, in fact concealed a racially discriminatory 
motive or purpoo e. E.~., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 
(1960); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). No such 
suggestion has been or can be made in this case. 
~ The approach required by Title VII is quite different. 
~ n inquiry into impact is required by the statute - as is 
4 ~ L' ~ '~~ppropriate given the Act's remedial purpose. 
~ J~·, ~ 
 If strict scrutiny of the test challenged here is 
not required under ordinary equal protection analysis, the 
test should survive the challenge. Verbal facility does 
----------~-- ---
b: ar c:_ r~tional __::;a t;,!on;,.hip _!:o ~he c,~m:=ca;ion skil:.= ~ ~ 
ability to grasp complex legal concepts that m~k a successful f 
~._.. ....... ,.-.. Lw;7't c:r=s~~""'l:4£1~ ........ .._ 
pe ce o~r. 
6. 
This Court must decide (either explicitly or 
implicitly) whether ordinary equal protection analysis or 
Title VII law is to be applied in this case. But I doubt 
that this very important question should be decided on the 
briefs we have, for they do not address the issue at all. 
Perhaps reargument and additional briefing should be arranged, 
if there is any sentiment to do this in the Conference. If 
it is decided eventually that equal protection analysis is 
appropriate, the case should be remanded so that the 
complaint can be amended. I realize that all this sounds 
like a drastic move this late in the game, but it is 
better to do this than to constitutionalize Griggs and Title 
VII sub silentio. 
Because you may prefer to apply Title VII analysis 
and reach the questions briefed by the parties, I will discuss 
those issues too: 
T ... '~Y.iT '~ .. .... 
II. Have Respondents Proved that the Test Has a Discriminatory 
Impact? 
The district judge, all three members of the court of 
appeals panel, and the SG agree that respondents have established 
} 
7. 
that th~ t~t used by the Department has an adverse impact 
on black applicants. I agree that this impact has been 
sufficiently established by proof of greatly disproportionate 
(over four-to-one) pass-fail ratios. There is also evidence 
that the number of blacks employed is not proportionate to 
the number of black residents in the District of Columbia area, 
although the Court of Appeals did not rely on these statistics. 
Petitioners argue that these data do not establish an 
adverse impact where the test does not select applicants for 
hire in a pattern significantly different from the pool of 
applicants. (Blacks constituted 53% of all applicants in 1970-71 and 
43% of those selected for appointment.) Moreover, petitioners 
argue, the percentage of new black recruits since 1969 (44%) 
correlates favorably with the percentage of eligible blacks 
residing within a 50-mile radius of the city. But, even if 
these figures - which focus on a limited time period and a 
very large geographic area - provided some indication that the 
Department has hired blacks in numbers proportionate to their 
representation in the applicant pool and in the population at 
large, respondent's prima facie case relying on pass-fail rates 
would not be disturbed. 
Some lower courts have held that "disparate population 
figures" are sufficient, even in the absence of an unbalanced 
pass-fail rate, to establish that an employment practice has a 
discriminatory impact. See cases cited in CADC opinion at 8a 
n. 25. Others have used population data to corroborate 
a showing of adverse impact based on pass-fail rates. See 
cases cited id. at 8a n. 26. But I could find no case that 
used population data to rebut clearly disproportionate pass-
fail rates or required disparate population rates figures in 
addition to pass-fail rates in order to establish a prima 
facie case of impact. Indeed, it makes no sense to say that 
strong hiring statistics in themselves can destroy a prima 
facie case in the face of highly disporportionate pass-fail 
rates, for blacks may have been hired at a rate even greater 
than their proportion in the applicant pool had the results 
of the discriminatory test not been a factor in the hiring 
decision. 
Petitioners also suggest that their active effort 
8. 
to recruit black applicants should be taken into account in deter-
mining whether the challenged test has an adverse impact. 
And the SG suggests that, if the case is to be remanded, 
petitioners be permitted to introduce evidence that the 
recruiting program has affected the applicant pool in such a 
way as to produce atypical pass-fail rates. 
An active recruitment program in itself should not 
be enough to rebut a showing that a test used to screen the 
applicants has a discriminatory impact. No amount of 
affirmative effort in attracting minorities to apply for a job 
9. 
will be effective if those that do apply are then faced with 
an artificial barrier to employment, such as a discriminatory 
test with no job-related purpose. ~~~··"~ ca-.~.~ 
Nor am I persuaded by the SG's argument that the 
pass-fail data may be atypical. First, the data in this 
case do not support the argument that the recruitment effort 
may have influenced the pass-fail rate. There was no increase 
in the percentage of black applicants during the recruitment 
period. In fact, there was a decrease from 66.3% in 1968 and 70.3% 
in 1969, to 52.1% in 1970 and 55.6% in 1971. App. 34. 
Between 1969 and 1971, black applications declined by 0.6% 
and white applications increased by 88%. Resp. Br. at 
6-7 n. 10. Moreover, there was no change in the black-white 
pass-fail ratios after the recruitment program was begun. 
In the years 1968-1971, black pass rates were 45.6%, 41.4%, 
44.7%, and 43.2%, respectively, while white pass rates were 
84.7%, 84.5%, 87.7%, and 88.1%. App. 34. 
It might be argued that, in another case with 
different data, the impact of affirmative recruitment efforts 
on pass-fail rates should be taken into account in order to 
avoid the discouragement of affirmative efforts by employers 
who fear that a wider, less qualified black applicant pool 
will cause a previously neutral test to exhibit a discriminatory 
pass-fail rate. On its face, this argument appears to have 
some merit. But it makes no logical sense. The response to 
10. 
the problem is provided by the job-related prong of 
the Griggs test, rather than by finding that no "impact" 
exists. If unqualified blacks are being drawn into the 
applicant pool by the recruitment effort, they can be 
screened out legitimately by a job-related test. If a 
~-job-related test exhibits a discriminatory pass-fail rate 
when the pool of black applicants has been widened, the test 
should be eliminated, for its only purpose is to screen out 
In short, an employer has 
I 
the discriminated against class. 
a legitimate interest in preserving his testing program 
only if it is job-related. Again, we must be mindful that 
an affirmative effort to recruit black applicants is 
meaningless if the employer retains a discriminatory test that 
weeds out black applicants without a job-related reason. 
Petitioners argue that the court should not inquire 
into discriminatory impact unless there is some evidence 
of prior overt discrimination. This argument is based on the 
language in Griggs to the effect that "[u]nder [Title VII], 
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and 
even neutral in terms of in~ent, cannot be maintained if they 
operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory 
employment practices." 401 U.S. at 430 . (emphasis added). 
Where there are no "prior discriminatory employment practices," 
petitioners argue, a test neutral on its face and in intent 
is acceptable under the Act. This is not an implausible argument. 
11. 
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the 
other Supreme Court case involving discriminatory testing, there 
was a prior history of segregation of employees. But I find 
it difficult to limit the requirements of Griggs to cases with 
an overt history of segregation. The effect would be to 
allow present discrimination (in effect, if not in intent) 
by some employers and not by others. The language of Title VII 
is not so limited. Section 703(a)(2) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(2), prohibits any employer from "classify[ing] 
his employees in any way which would deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities •.• because of such individual's 
race." This is an "impact" test not limited to situations ....... ,., 
where a prior history of overt discrimination exists. And 
Griggs said that the purpose of the Act is not only to remedy 
past overt discrimination but to "achieve equality of employment 
opportunities." 401 U.S. at 429. To that end, "[w]hat is 
required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, 
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate 
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other 
... , 
impermissible classification. Id. at 431. 
III. Have Petitioners Established that the Test is Job-related? 
The court of appeals held that petitionrs had not 
established "job-relatedness" because a relation between an 
employment test and "trainability" is not sufficient to establish 
12. 
"job-relatedness." It seems clear from the legislative 
history that Congress did intend to permit the use of 
tests "to determine the trainability of prospective employees." -110 Gong. Rec. 13492 (remarks of Senator Tower). See also 
EEOC Regulation S2-2a(2), 37 Fed. Reg. 21557. In this 
respect, the court of appeals erred. But, as the SG 
correctly points out, the relationship of an employment 
test to trainability can establish that the test is "job-
related" only if the test is predictive of "properly measured 
success" in training and if the training itself is related to 
job performance. Petitioners have not established that either J 
of these two relationships exist. 
In requiring evidence that the test is indicative 
of success in training, we need not require that the employer 
prove that he has set the passing score as low as possible; 
given a positive relationship between test scores and success 
in training, the passing score can be set anywhere within a 
reasonable range. The employer can insist on the best employees 
possible. Nor need we require the employer to prove that 
those who do not pass would perform poorly in the training 
program; such proof would be impossible without admitting 
every applicant. 
The employment test attacked here has a postivt e 
correlation to performance on Recruit School examination scores. 
But petitioners have not established that the Recruit School 
tests reflect success in training. The problem of 
evaluating success is training is somewhat obscured in this 
case because, under Police Department policy, every hiree 
eventually passes the training program. But, especially 
13. 
where both the challenged test and the measure of success in 
bo+h 
training are written examinations and where the job requires 
1\ 
no skill in taking written examinations, some proof that 
the Recruit School scores accurately measure training success 
is necessary. In the absence of such proof, the correlation of 
employment and training school test scores may merely indicate 
tha t certain applicants are skilled at taking written 
examinations. 
Petitioner has also failed to offer evidence that the 
training program bears on subsequent job performance. Indeed, 
the one study that has been conducted indicated that there 
is ~ significant correlation between Recruit School test scores 
and subsequent job performance. See CADC opinion at 13a 
f€.Cex\ \:.\~ 
n 44. And the training programAhas been changed - from 
the "academic" approach previously emphasized to a more 
practical, "job proficiency" training that presumably de-
emphasizes skills measured by written tests. 
It might appear from this that the appropriate 
disposition of the case is to remand for an evidentiary 
hearing to develop these questions more fully. The difficulty 
~ 14. ~~ with this is that the parties apparently have no more 
evidence to offer. Petitioners seek to establish job-relatedness 
on the basis of the Futransky study conducted in 1967. But 
the inadequacies of that study have been detailed above (it 
merely measures the relation of entrance scores to Recruit 
School scores and demonstrated that there is no correlation 
between the latter scores and job performance). Moreover, no 
new evidentiary studies can be made because the training 
program has been modified. The challenged test is still being I 
administered, but the "academic" training program to which 
it was claimed to relate is no longer in existence. 
The appropriate step to take under the circumstances 
appears to be that taken by the court of appeals - to remand 
for determination of the appropriate remedy. In determining 
proper relief, the district court can evaluate the relation 
between the test and the new training program. If there is 
a positive relation between test and training and if the new training 
program is positively related to job performance, injunctive 
·relief would be inappropriate. There is the further sticky I question of back pay. The district court may find that~ 
chang~ in the training program and in recruitment techniques 
makea it impossible to determine which applicants would have been 
c• 
hired in the past and 
of that determination 




are best left 
to back pay. The difficulties 
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See the excellent memorandum of February 23, by Chris. 
I dictate this summary primarily to focus on aspects of the 




This case was brought as a class action by Negro 
a licants to the D.C. police force who failed an entrance 
exam known as Test 21. ~s~d~asure verbal skills; 
jgetween 1968 and 1971 some 57% of Negro applicants failed ; 
the failure rate for white applicants was 13%. 
Successful applicants are required to attend the Recruit 
School, an intensive police training program. The evidence 
showed a direct correlation between success on Test 21 and 
subsequent performance on Recruit School tests. But everyone 
who attends the Recruit School is given passing marks; and 
no evidence was presented (probably none is available) with 
respect to correlation between test scores and subsequent 
job performance. 
The Complaint 
The complaint averred a cause of action under the Equal 
Protection Clause and § 198l~serting that the test 
impermissibly discriminates against Negroes. 
·2. 
No cause of action is averred under Title VII. At the 
time suit was instituted, Title VII was not applicable to 
federal employees. But the complaint was not amended following 
the 1972 extension of Title VII to such employees. 
The Courts Below 
Judge Gessell granted the government's motion for summary 
judgment. He found that the evidence supported a need for 
verbal skills by policemen both in the Recruit School and in 
the performance of their duties. He also emphasized the 
vigorous recruiting of Negro policemen, and the absence of 
any discriminatory intent. 
CADC reversed. Without addressing the failure of the 
complaint to rely on Title VII, it said that the Plaintiffs 
"unquestionably are entitled to the benefit of the amendment" 
to Title VII. 
Sovereign Immunity 
The government may not be sued for damages (back pay 
is claimed) under the Equal Protection Clause absent a waiver 
of sovereign immunity. We have not decided whether § 1981 
constitutes such a waiver. This is a threshold question in 
this case. 
Applicable Standard - Equal Protection or Title VII 
Lower courts usually have made no distinction between 
Title VII standards and those appropriate under the Equal 
3. 
Protection Clause. In McDonell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 802 
n. 14, I cited lower court equal protection cases that applied 
the Griggs standard - although we did not address specifically 
whether a distinction in standards exist. 
In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, a sex discrimination 
case, we made clear that (at least where sex discrimination is 
alleged) the Equal Protection Clause in Title VII is not J 
• ( ~ J- -+- ~A- ~ ~ .l:L/(7 G~"'-'""-coextensl.ve. J  ·-- -,- ~1 
Absent a showing that the classification (the test) is 
either explicitly race-based or a mere pretext to conceal 
discrimination, the strict scrutiny test is not applicable 
if this is an equal protection case. 
But in a Title VII case a "discriminatory impact" alone 
apparently is sufficient to invoke strict scrutiny. Griggs 
v. Duke Power is so read. ~ ~ )11( c~./A ~ 
If Viewed as an Equal Protection Case 
Despite the failure of CADC (and apparently the parties 
in this litigation) to see a different, there are significant 
differences - actual and potential - between Title VII and 
Equal Protection cases. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 
421 U.S. 454, we said that § 1981 and Title VII are separate 
and distinct remedies. 
Differences include the following: 
(i) Employees who sue under Title VII are required 
to exhaust administrative remedies. We have not yet 
·4. 
determined whether such exhaustion is required as a 
precondition to a 1981 suit. 
in Brown v. GSA. 
The issue is before us 
(ii) If the "strict scrutiny" Title VII analysis 
also applies in Equal Protection cases, employees are 
unlikely to use Title VII procedures. In addition to 
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, Title 
VII imposes a limitation on back pay. No such limitation 
exists under § 1981. 
if 
Thus,/the standards of liability are identical (i.e. 
scrutiny in both situations) there will be a 
for employees to use Title VII procedure contrary to congressional 
intent. 
Equal Protection Analysis 
As Geduldig refused to apply strict scrutiny to a sex-
based discrimination, there is Q~ai~~ no reason to apply 
it here where no claim is made of a discriminatory intent or 
that the test is pretextual. 
If the rational basis test is applied, as I believe it 
should, the case should be reversed. Verbal facility bears 
to the communication skills. Moreover, 
such skill. 
But the parties have not briefed this case on this basis. 
We could consider setting it for reargument. 
If Title VII Applies 
The language of § 703(a)(2) of Title VII prohibits an 
employer from "classifying his employees in any way which 
would deprive any individual of employment opportunities 
5. 
. . . bec~ndividual' s race". This is an 'impact" 
test, not limited to s~tuations where a prior history of 
'\ 
discrimination exists. 
Both courts below found that this test has an adverse 
II '' impact on Negro applicants. This shifts the burden to the 
government to prove that the test in fact is job related. 
The evidence here is scant or nonexistent. There is evidence 
that the test is related to grades in training school, but - ~ 
apparently evid;nce falls shor~ that the training school 
~ 
itself is related to job performance. There is no evidence -
and it would be hard to obtain - relating the test to job 
performance. 
CADC remanded the case for evidence on these issues. - -It was decided on summary judgment, but it is unlikely that 
~ 
evidence will be forthcoming. This could mean that plaintiffs 
could win, possibly undeservedly, large back-pay awards. 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No .. 74-1492 
Walter E . Washington, etc., I On Writ of Certiorari to 
et al., Petitioners, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Dis-
Alfred E. Davis et al. trict of Columbia Circuit. 
[April -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case involves the validity of a qualifying test 
administered to applicants for positions as police officers 
in the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment. The test was sustained by the District Court but 
invalidated by the Court of Appeals. We are in agree-
ment with the District Court and hence reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
I 
This action began on April 10, 1970, when two Negro 
police officers filed suit against the then Commissioner 
of the District of Columbia, the Chief of the District's 
Metropolitan Police Department and the Commissioners 
of the United States Civil Service Commission.1 An 
1 Under § 4-103 of t he D1strict of Columbia Code, appointments 
to the Metropolitan police force were to be made by the Com-
missioner subJect to the provisions of Title 5 of the United States 
Code relatmg to the classified rivil service, The District of Co-
lumbia Council and t he Office of Commissioner of the District of 
Columbia, established by ReorganizatiOn Plan No. 37 of 1967, were 
abolished as of January 2, 1975, and replaced by th E) Council of 
the District of Columbia and th.e Office of Mayor of the District 
Q{ Columbta.. 
74-1492-0PINION 
WASHINGTON v. DAVIS 
amended complaint, filed December 10, alleged that the 
promotion policies of the Department were racially dis-
criminatory and sought a declaratory judgment and an 
injunction. The respondents Harley and Sellers were 
permitted to intervene, their amended complaint assert-
ing that their applications to become officers in the 
Department had been rejected, and that the Depart-
ment's recruiting procedures discriminated on the basis 
of race against black applicants by a series of practices 
including, but not limited to, a written personnel test 
which excluded a disproportionately high number of 
Negro applicants, These practices were asserted to vio-
late respondents' rights "under the due process clause 
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, under 42 U. S. C. § 1981 and under D. C. Code 
§ 1-320." 2 Defendants answered, and discovery and 
2 Title 42 U. S. C. § 1981 provides : 
"All persoiL'3 within the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
lutve the same right m every State and Territory to make and en-
force contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedmgs for the security of 
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizeiL'3, and shall be 
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, liceiL'3es, and 
exactioiL'3 of every kind, and to no other." 
Section 1-320 of the District of Columbia Code provides: 
"In any program of recwtment or hinng of individuals to fill 
positions in the government of the District of Columbia, no officer 
·or employee of the government of the District of Columbia shall 
exclude or give preference to the res1dents of the District of Co-
lumbia or any State of the United States on the basis of residence, 
religion, race, color, or natwnal origin ." 
One of the provisions expressly made applicable to the Metro-
politan police force by § 4-103 1s 5 U. S. C. § 3304 (a) which 
prov1des : 
"§ 3304. Competitive service, examinations. 
" (a) The President may prescribe rules which shall provide, M 
nearly as conditions of good administration warrant, for-
,, (1) open, competitive examinations for testing applicants for 
74-1492-0PINION 
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various other proceedings followed. 3 Respon,dents then 
filed ~ motion for P!trtial summary judgment with re-
spect to the recruiting phase of the case, seeking a dec-
laration that the test administered to those applying to 
become pQlice officer~ is "unlawfully discriminatory and 
therefore in violation of the Due Process Clauf)e of the 
Fifth Amendment .... " No issue under any statute 
or regulation was raised by the motion. The District of 
Columbia defendants, petitioners here, and the federal 
parties also filed motions for summary judgment with 
respect to the recruiting aspects of the case asserting 
that respondents were entitled to relief on neither con-
stitutional nor statutory grounds.4 The District Court 
granted petitioners' and denied respondents' motions. 
Davis v. Washington, 34:8 F. Supp. 15 (DC 1972). 
According to the findings and conclusions of the Dis-
trict Court, to be accepted by the Department ~nd to 
enter an intensive 17-week training program, the police 
vecruit was required to satisfy certain physical and 
character standards, to be a high school grad~ate or its 
appointment in the competitive service which are practical in char. 
acter and as far as possible relate to matters that fairly test thet 
relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the appointment 
sought; and 
" (2) noncompetitive examinatiqns when competent applicants do· 
not compete after notice has been given of the existence of the-
vacancy." 
The complaint asserted no claim under § 3304. 
8 Those proceedings included a hearing on respondents' motiorn 
for an order designating the case as a class action. A ruling on 
the motion was held in abeyance and was neve~ · granted insofar as· 
the record before us reveals. 
4 In support of the motion, petitioners and the federal parties· 
urged tha,t they were in compliance with all applicable constitutional;. 
statutory and regulatory provisions, including the provisions of the 
Civil Service Act which since 1883 were said to have establishedl 
o\l. "ioh rel~J.tedness" sta.ndard. fot employment .. 
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equivalent and to receive a grade of at least 40 on ''Tes~ 
21 ," which is "an examination that is used generally 
throughout the federal service," which "was developed 
py the Civil Service Commission not the Police Depart.; 
ment" and which was "designed to test verbal ability, 
vocabulary, reading an,d comprehension." 348 F. Supp., 
~t 16. 
The validity of Test 21 was the sole issue before the 
court on the motions for summary judgment. The Dis-
trict Court noted that there was no claim of "an in-
tentional discrimination or purposeful discriminatory 
~tctions" but only a claim that Test 21 bore no relation-
ship to job performance and "has a highly discriminatory 
impact in screening out black candidates." 348 F. Supp., 
at 16. Petitioners' evidence, the District Court said, 
warranted three conclusions: "(a) The number of black 
police officers, while substantial, is not proportionate to 
the population mix of the city. (b) A higher percentage 
of blacks fail the Test than whites. (c) The Test has 
not been validated to establish its reliability for meas-
uring subsequent job performance." Ibid. This show-
ing was deemed sufficient to shift the burden of proof 
to the defendants in the action, petitioners here; but the 
court nevertheless concluded that on the undisputed 
facts respondents were not entitled to relief. The Dis-
trict Court relied on several factors. Since August 1969, 
44% of new police force recruits had been black; that 
'figure also represented the proportion of blacks on the 
.total force and was roughly equivalent to 20-29-year-old 
blacks in the 50-mile radius in which the recruiting 
efforts of the Police Department had been concentrated. 
It was undisputed that the Department had systemati .. 
'cally and affirmatively sought to enroll black officers 
many of whom passed the test but failed to report fot 
'duty. The District Court r,~jeeted the assertion th',a:t 
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Test 21 was culturally slanted. to favor whites and was 
"satisfied that the undisputable facts prove the test to 
be reasonably and directly related to the requirements ' 
of the police recruit training program and that it is 
neither so designed nor operated to discriminate against 
otherwise qualified blacks." 348 F. Supp., at 17. It 
was thus not necessary to show that Test 21 was not only 
a useful indicator of training school performance but 
had also been validated in terms of job performance-
"the lack of job performance validation does not defeat 
the test, given its direct relationship to recruiting and 
the valid part it plays in this process." The District 
Court ultimately concluded . that "the proof is wholly 
lacking that a police officer qualifies on the color of his 
skin rather than ability" and that the Department 
"should not be required on this showing to lower stand-
ards or to abandon efforts to achieve excellence." 5 348 
F. Supp., at 18. 
Having lost on both constitutional and statutory issues 
in the District Court, respondents brought the case to the 
Court of Appeals claiming that their summary judgment 
motion, which rested on purely constitutional grounds, 
should have been granted. The tendered constitutional 
issue was whether the use of Test 21 invidiously discrim-
inated against Negroes and hence denied them due proc-
ess of law contrary to the commands of the Fifth Amend- · 
ment. The Court of Appeals, addressing that is8ue, 
announced that it would be guided by Griggs v. Duke· 
Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), a case involving the 
'3 When summary judgment was granted, the case with respect to 
discrimina,tory promotions was still pending. The District Court, 
however, made the determination and direction authorized by Fed .. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 54 (b) . The promotion issue was subsequently 
decided adversely to the original plaintiffs. Davis v. Washington., 
35~ F. Supp. 187 (DC 1972). 
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interpretation and application of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, and held that the statutory standards 
elucidated in that case were to govern the due process 
question tendered in this one.6 168 U. S. App. D. C. 42, 
512 F. 2d 956 (1975). The court went on to declare 
that lack of discriminatory intent in designing and 
administering Test 21 was irrelevant; the critical fact 
was rather that a far greater proportion of blacks--. 
four times as many-failed the test than did whites. 
This disproportionate impact, standing alone and with-
out regard to whether it indicated a discriminatory 
purpose, was sufficient to establish a constitutional 
violation, absent proof by petitioners that the test was 
an adequate measure of job performance in addition 
to being an indicator, of probable success in the train-
ing program, a burden which the court ruled petition-
ers had failed to discha.rge. That the Department 
had made substantial efforts to recruit blacks was beside 
the pomt and the fact that the racial distribution of re~ 
cent hirings and of the Department itself might be 
roughly equivalent to the racial makeup of the surround~ 
ing community, broadly conceived, was put aside as a 
"comparison [not] material to this appeal." 168 U. S. 
App. D. C., at 46 n. 24; 512 F. 2d, at 960 n. 24. The 
Court of Appeals, over a dissent, accordingly reversed 
the judgment of the District Court and directed that 
respondents' motion for partial summary judgment be 
6 "Although appellants' complaint did not allege a violation of 
Title VII of the CIVil Rights Act of 1964, which then was inappli-
cable to the Federal Government, decisions applying Title VII 
furnish additional instruction as to the legal standard governing the 
issues raised in this case The many decisions dtsposing of employ-
ment discrimination clatms on constitutional grounds have made no 
distinction between the constitutional standard and the statutory 
standard tmder Tttle VII." Footnote 2 of the Court of Appeals 
opimon, 168 U. S. App D C., at 44 n. 2, 512 F . 2d, at 958. 
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granted. We granted the petition for certiorari, 423 
U. S. 820 (1975), filed by the District of Columbia 
officials. 7 
II 
Because the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the 
legal standards applicable to Title VII cases in resolving 
the constitutional issue before it, we reverse its judgment 
in respondents' favor. Although the petition for certio-
rari did not present this ground for reversal,8 our Rule 
40 (l)(d) (2) provides that we "may notice a plain error 
not presented"; 9 and thie is an appropriate occasion to 
invoke the rule. 
As the Court of Appeals understood Title VII/0 em .. 
1 The Civil Service Commissioners, defendants in the District 
Court, did not petition for writ of certiorari but have filed a brief 
as respondents. See our Rule 25 ( 4) . We shall at times refer to 
them as the "federal parties." 
8 Apparently not disputing the applicability of the Griggs and 
Title VII standards in resolving this case, petitioners presented 
issues going only to whether Griggs had been misapplied by the 
Court of Appeals. 
9 See, e. g., Silber v. United States, 370 U. S. 717 (1962); Brother• 
hood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 412 ( 1947); 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co ., 312 U. S. 1, 16 (1941); Mahler v. 8by, 
264 U. S. 32, 45 (1924); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 
362 (1910) . 
10 Although Title VII standards have dominated this case, this 
is not a Title VII case. The statute was not applicable to federal 
employees when the complaint was filed . The 1972 amendments 
extendmg the title to reach government employees were adopted 
prior to ~he District Court's judgment, but the complaint was not 
amended to state a claim under that title, nor did the ca:se there-
after proceed as a Title VII case. Respondents' motion for partial 
summary judgment, filed after the 1972 amendments, rested solely 
on constitutional grounds; and the Court of Appeals ruled that the 
motion should have been granted . 
At the oral argument before this Court, when petitioners' counsel 
was asked whether "this is just a purely Title VII case as it come!3' 
t<.>. us from the Covrt Q( Appeals w\thQut any constitutional over-
.,. 
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ployees or applicants proceeding under it need not con .. 
cern themselves with the employer's possibly discrimina-
tory purpose but instead may focus solely on the racially 
differential impact of the challenged hiring or promotion 
practices. This is not the cop.stitutional rule. We have 
never held that the constitutional standard for adjudi-
cating claims of invidiol.l.s racial discrimination is iden-
tical to the standards applicable under Title VII, and we 
decline to do so today. 
The .central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official 
conduct discriminating on the basis of race. It is · also 
true that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment contains an equal protection component prohibiting 
the United States from invidiously discriminating be-
tween individuals or groups . . Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U. S. 497 (1954). But our cases have not embraced the 
proposition that a law or other official act, without re-· 
gard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory pur-
pose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially 
disproportionate impact. 
Almost 100 years ago, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100' 
U. S. 303 (1879), established that the exclusion of Ne-
groes froq1 grand and petit juries in criminal proceedings· 
violated the 1 Equal Protection Clause, but the fact that· 
a particular jury or a series of juries does not statistically 
reflect the racial composition of the community does not· 
in itself make out an invidious discrimination forbidden 
by the Clause. "A purp·ose to discriminate must be pres-
ent which may be proven by systematic exclusion of eli-
gible jurymen of the prescribed race or by an unequal' 
!tPPlication of the law to such an extent as to show inten-
tones," counsel responded : "My trouble honestly with that propo-
sition is the procedural requirements to get into court under Title: 
VII and. this case has not lllet th.em." Tr .. Qf Oral Arg_., at 66. 
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tional discrimination." Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 
403-404 (1945) . A defendant in a criminal case is en-
titled "to require that the State not deliberately and 
systematically deny to the members of his race the right 
to participate as jurors in the administration of justice." 
See also Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U. S. 320, 335-
337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287-290 
(1950); Patton v. M'ississippi, 332 U. S. 463, 468-4.69 
(1947) . 
The rule is the same in other contexts. Wright v. 
Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964) , upheld a New York 
congressional apportionment statute against claims that 
district lines had been racially gerrymandered. The chal-
lenged districts were made up predominantly of whites or 
of minority races, and their boundaries were irregularly 
drawn. The challengers did not prevail because they 
failed to prove that the New York legislature "was either 
motivated by racial' considerations or in fact drew the 
districts on racial lines"; the plaintiffs had not shown 
that the statute "was the product of a state contrivance 
· to segregate on the basis of race or place of origin." 376 
U. S., at 56, 58. The dissenters were in agreement that 
the issue was whether the "boundaries ... were purpose-
fully drawn on racial lines." 376 U. S., at 67. 
The school desegregation cases have also adhered to 
the basic equal protection principle that the invidious 
quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory 
must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory 
purpose. That there are both predominantly black and 
predominantly white schools in a community is not alone 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The essen-
tial element of de jure segregation is "a current condition 
of segregation resulting from intentional state action . . . 
the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and 
so-called de facto segregation ... is purpose or intent to 
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segregate." Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U. S. 
189, 205, 208 (1973) . See also id., at 199, 211, 213. 
The Court has also recently rejected allegations of racial 
discrimination based solely on the statistically dispro-
portionate racial impact of various provisions of the 
Social Security Act because "the acceptance of appellant's 
constitutional theory would render suspect each differ· 
ence in treatment among the grant classes, however hook .. 
ing the racial motivation and however rational the treat. 
ment might be." Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 
548 (1972). And compare Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 
385 (1969), with James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S.137 (1971). 
This is not to say that the necessary discriminatory 
racial purpose must be e~press or appear on the face of 
the statute, or that a law's disproportionate impact is ir-
relevant in cases involving Constitution-based claims of 
l'acial discrimination. A statute, otherwise neutral on 
its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discrim. 
inate on the basis of race. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 
'356 ( 1886). It is also clear from the cases dealing with 
racial discrimination in the selection of juries that the 
systematic exclusion of Negroes is itself such an "unequal 
application of the law .. . as to show intentional discrim-
ination."· Akins v. Texas, supra, at 404. Smith v. Texas, 
·311 U. S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 
(1939); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1881). A 
prima facie case of discriminatory purpose may be proved 
as well by the absence of Negroes on a particular jury 
combined with the failure of the jury commissioners to 
be informed of eligible Negro jurors in a community, Hill 
-v. 'Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 404 ( 1942) , or with racially non· 
neutral selection procedures, Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 
U.S. 625 (1972); Avery.v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); 
Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 (1967). With a prima. 
facie case made out, "the burden of proof shifts to the 
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State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action 
by showing that permissible racially neutral self)ction cri-
teria and procedures have produced the monochromatic 
result." Alexander, supra, at 632. See also Turner v, 
Fouche, 396 U.S. 3'l6, 361 (1970); Eub'anks v. Louisiana, 
356 U.S. 584, 587 (1958). 
Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose must 
often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, 
including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more 
heavily on one race than another. It is also not infre .. 
q1.1ently true that the discriminatory impact-in the jury 
cases for example, the total or seriously disproportionate 
exclusion of Negroes from jury venires-may for all prac-
tical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in 
various circumst11nces it is very difficult to explain on 
nonracial grounds. Nevertheless, we have not held that 
a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise 
within the power of government to pursue, is invalid 
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may 
effect a greater proportion of one race than of another. 
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not 
the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination 
forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does 
not trigger the rule, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 
184 ( 1964), that racial classifications are to be subjected 
to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the 
weightiest of considerations. 
There ·are some indications to the contrary in our 
cases. In Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217 (1971), 
the city of Jackson, Miss. , following a court decree to this 
effect, desegregated all of its public facilities save five 
swimming pools which had been operated by the city 
and which, following the decree, were closed by ordinance 
pursuant to a determination by the city council that 
closure was necessary to preserve peace and order and 
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that integrated pools could not be economically operated. 
Accepting the finding that the pools were closed to 
avoid violence and economic loss, this Court rejected the 
argument that the abandonment of this service was in-
consistent with the outst~:j.nding desegregation decree and 
that the otherwise seemingly permissible ends served by 
the ordinance could be impeached by demonstrating that 
racially invidious motivations had prompted the city 
council's action. The holding was that the city was not 
overtly or covertly operating segregated pools and was 
extending identical treatment to both whites and Negroes. 
The opinion warned against grounding decision on legis· 
lative purpose or motivation, thereby lending support for 
the proposition that the operative effect of the law rather 
than its purpose is the paramount factor. But the hold-
ing of the case was that the legitimate purposes of the 
ordinance-to preserve peace and avoid deficits-were 
not open to impeachment by evidence that the council· 
men were· actually motivated· by racial considerations. 
Whatever dicta the opinion may contain, the decision 
did not involve, much less invalidate, a statute or ordi· 
nance having neutral purposes but disproportionate ra,. 
cial consequences. 
Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 
451 ( 1972), also indicates that in proper circumstances, 
the racial impact of a law, rather than its discriminatory 
purpose, is the critical factor. That case involved the 
division of a school district. The issue was whether the 
division was consistent with nn outstanding order of a 
federal court to desegregate the dual school system found 
to have existed in the area. The constitutional predicate 
for the District Court's invalidation of the divided dis-
trict was "the enforcement until 1969 of racial segre. 
gation in the public school system of which Emporia had 
always been a part." Id., at 459. There was thus no 
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need to find "an independent constitutional violation." 
Ibid. Citing Palmer v. Thompson, we agreed with the 
District Court that the division of the district had the 
effect of interfering with the federal decree and should 
be set aside. 
That neither Palmer nor Wright was understood to 
have changed the prevailing rule is apparent from Keyes 
v. School District No. 1, supra, where the principal issue 
in litigation was whether and to what extent there had 
been purposeful discrimination resulting in a partially 
or wholly segregated school system. Nor did other later 
cases, Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, and Jefferson v. 
Hackney, supra, indicate that either Palmer or Wright 
had worked a fundamental change in equal protection 
law.11 
Both before and after Palmer v. Thompson, however, 
various Courts of Appeals have held in several contexts, 
including public employment, that the substantially dis-
proportionate racial impact of a statute or official prac~ 
tice standing alone and without regard to discrimin~ttory 
purpose, suffices to prove racial discrimination violating· 
the Equal Protection Clause absent some justification 
going substantially beyond what would be necessary to 
validate most other legislative classifications.12 The 
11 To the extent that Palmer suggests a generally applicable 
proposition that legislative purpose is irrelevant in constitutional 
adjudication, our prior cases-as indicated in the text-are to the 
contrary; and very shortly after Palmer, all Members of the Court 
majority in that case joined the Court's opinion in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), which dealt with the issue of public fi-
nancing for private schools and which announced, as the Court had 
several times before, that the validity of public aid to church-related 
schools includes close inquiry into purposes of the challenged statute. 
12 Cases dealing w1th public employment include: Chance v. 
Boara of Exammers, 458 F. 2d 1167, 1176-1177 (CA2 1972); Castro 
v. Beecher, 459 F . 2d 7Z5, 732'-733 (CAl 1972); Bridgeport Guar-· 
dlians v. BriuUgeport Civil/. &!ivi:e C'omm'n, 482 F . 2d 1333, 1331 
\ 
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cases impressively demonstrate. that there is another side 
to the issue; but, with all due respect, we cannot agree 
with these decisions. 
As an initial matter, we have · difficulty understanding 
how a law establishing a racially neutral qualification 
for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory and 
denies "any person equal protection of the_laws" simply 
because a greater proportion of Negroes fail to qualify 
than members of other racial or ethnic groups. Had re· 
spondents, along with all others who had failed Test 21, 
whether white or black, brought an action claiming that 
'the test denied each of them equal protection ·of the laws 
·as compared with those who had passed with high enough 
(CA2 1973); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1200 
(Md.), aff'd in pertinent part, sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F. 
2d 1134 (CA4 1973); Douglas v. Hampton, - U. S. App. D. C. 
-, 512 F. 2d 976, 981 (1975); but cf. Tyler v. Vickery, 517 
F. 2d 1089, 1096-1097 (CA5 1975), petition for certiorari pending, 
No. 75-1026 0. T. 1975. There are also District Court cases: Wade 
v. Misstssippi Co'Operative Extension Service, 372 F. Supp. 126, 143 
(ND Miss. · 1974); Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723, 736, 737 
(ND Ohio .1975); United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 
543, 553 (ND Ill. 1974); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 351 F. Supp. 
721, 724 (Minn. 1972), reversed on other grounds, 498 F. 2d 143 
(CA8 1974) . 
In other contexts there are Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevolp-
ment Agency, 395 F. 2d 920 (CA2 1968) (urban renewal); Kennedy 
Park Homes Assn., Inc. v. City of Lackawana, 436 F. 2d 108, 114 
(CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1970) (zoning); Southern 
Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F. 2d 291 
(CA9 1970) (dictum) (zoning) ; Metropolitan H. D. Corp. v. Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights, 517 F. 2d 409 (CA7 1975), cert. granted 
December 1~, 1975, - U. S. - (zoning); Gautreaux v. Romney, 
448 F . 2d 731 , 738 (dictum) (CA7 1971) (public housing); Crow v. 
Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 391 (ND Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F . 2d 788 
(CA5 1972) (public housing) ; Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F. 2d 
1286 (CA5 W71), aff'd on rehearing en bane, 461 F. 2d 1171 (1972) 
~municipal serv1ces). 
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scores to qualify them as police recruits, it is most un-
likely that their challenge would have been sustained. 
Test 21, which is administered generally to prospective 
government employees, concededly seeks to ascertain 
whether those who take it have acquired a particular 
level of verbal skill; and it is untenable that the Consti-
tution prevents the government from seeking modestly to 
upgrade the communicative abilities of its employees 
rather than to be satisfied with some lower level of com-
petence, particularly where the job requires special abil-
ity to communicate orally and in writing. Respondents, 
as Negroes, could no more successfully claim that the 
test denied them equal protection than could white ap-
plicants who also failed. The conclusion would not be 
different in the face of proof that more Negroes than 
whites had been disqualified by Test 21. That other 
Negroes also failed to score well would, alone, not demon-
strate that respondents individually were being denied 
equal protection of the laws by the application of an 
otherwise valid qualifying test being administered to 
prospective police recruits. 
Nor on the facts of the case before us would the dis-
proportionate impact of Test 21 warrant the conclusion 
that it is a purposeful device to ·discriminate against 
Negroes and hence an infringement of the constitutional 
rights of respondents as well as other black applicants. 
As we have said, the test is neutral on its face and 
rationally may be said to serve a purpose the govern-
ment is constitutionally empowered to pursue. Even 
agreeing with the District Court that the differential 
racial effect of Test 21 called for further inquiry, we 
think the District Court correctly held that the affirm-
ative efforts of the Metropolitan Police Department to 
recruit black officers, the changing racial composition of 
'"-e, re~ruit. classes 3nd of the {Qrce in general, and th~ 
'• 
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relationship of the test to the training program negated 
any mference that the Department discriminated on the 
basis of race or that "a police officer qualifies on the 
color of his skin rather than ability." 348 F. Supp., 
at 18. 
Under Title VII, Congress provided that when hiring 
and promotion practices disqualifying substantially dis-
proportionate numbers of blacks are challenged, discrimi-
natory purpose need not be proved, and that it is an 
insufficient response to demonstrate some rational basis 
for the challenged practices. It is. necessary, in addition, 
that they be "validated" in terms of job performance in 
any one of several ways, perhaps by ascertaining the 
minimum skill, ability or potential necessary for the 
position at issue and determini:ng whether the qualifying 
tests are appropriate for the selection of qualified appli-
cants for the job in question.13 However this process 
13 It appears beyond doubt by now that there is no single method 
for appropriately validating employment tests for their relationship 
to job performance. Professional standards developed by the 
Ameman Psyc.hological Association in its Standards for Educational 
and Psychological Tests and Manuals (1966), accept three basic 
methods of validation: "empuical" or "criterion" validity (demon-
strated by identifying cntena that indiCate successful job perform-
ance and then correlating test scores and the criteria so identified), 
"construct" validity (demonstrated by examinations structured t~ 
measure the degree to which job applicants have identifiable char-
actenstics thQ,t have been determined to be important in successful 
JOb performance), and "content" validity (demonstrated by tests 
whose content closely approximates tasks to be performed on the 
JOb by the applicant). These standards have been relied upon by 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in fashioning its 
Gmdelines on Employment Selection procedures, 29 CFR pt. 1607, 
and have been Judicmlly noted in cases where validation of em-
ployment tests has been in ISSue. See, e. g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 431 (1975); Douglas v. Hampton, 168 U. S. 
App. D. C. 62, 512 F. 2d 976, 984 (1975); Vulcan Society v. Civil 
Serv1ce Comm'n, 490 F 2d 387, 394 (CA2 1973) . 
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proceeds, it involves a more probing judicial review of, 
and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of 
administrators and executives than is a.ppropria.te under 
the Constitution where special racial impact, without 
discriminatory purpose, is claimed. We are not disposed 
to adopt this more rigorous standard for the purposes 
of applying the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments 
in cases such as this. 
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is 
nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in 
practice it benefits or burdens one race more than an-
other would be far reaching and would raise serious 
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range 
of tax, welfa.re, public service, regulatory, and licensing 
statutes that ma.y be more burdensome to the poor and 
to the avera.ge black than to the more affluent white.14 
Given that rule, such consequences would perhaps in-
evitably follow. However, in our view, extension of 
the rule beyond those areas where it is already appli-
cable by reason of statute, such as in the field of public 
employment, should await legislative prescription. 
As we have indicated, it was error to direct sum-
mary judgment for respondents based on the Fifth 
Amendment. 
14 Goodman, De facto School Segregation: Constitutional and Em-
pirica.l Analysis, 60 Cal. L. Rev. 275, 300 ( 1972), suggests that dis-
proportionate impact analysis might invalidate "tests and qualHica-
tions for voting, draft deferment, public employment, jury service 
and other government-conferred benefits and opportunities . . . ; 
[s]ales taxes, bail schedules, utility rates, bridge tolls, license fees, 
and other state-imposed charges." It has also been argued that 
minimum wage and usury laws as well as professional licensing re-
quirements would require ma.jor modifications in light of the un-
. equal impact rule. Silverman, Equal Protection Economic Legisla-
tion and Racial Discrimination, 25 Vand. L. RElY. 1183 (1972). See 
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III 
W·e also hold that the Court of Appeals should have 
affirmed the judgment of the District Court granting ·the 
motions for summary judgment filed by petitioners and 
the federal parties. Respondents were entitled to relief 
on ne1ther constitutional nor statutory grounds. 
The submission of the defendants in the District 
Court was that Test 21 complied with all applicable stat-
utory as well as constitutional requirements; and they 
appear not to have disputed that under the statutes and 
regulations governing their conduct standards similar to 
those obtaining under Title VII had to be satisfied.15 
The District Court also assumed that Title VII stand-
. ards were to control the case, identified the determinative 
issue as whether Test 21 was sufficiently job related and 
· proceeded to uphold use of the test because it was 
"directly related to a determination of whether the ap-
plicant possesses sufficient skills requisite to the demands 
of the curriculum a recruit must master at the police 
academy." 348 F. Supp., at 17. The Court of Appeals 
reversed because the relationship between Test 21 and 
u In their memorandum supporting their motion for swnmary 
judgment, the federal parties argued : 
"In Griggs, supra, the Supreme Court set a job-relationship standard 
for the private sector employee;; which has been a standard for 
federal employment since the passage of the Civil Service Act in 
1883. In that act Congres::; has mandated that the federal govern-
ment must use ' . . examinations for testing applicants for appoint-
ment ... which .. as far as possible relate to matters that fairly 
test the relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the 
appomtments sought. ' 5 U.S. C. §3304 (a)(l). Defendants con-
tend that they have been following the job-related standards of 
Grtggs, supra, for the past eighty-eight years by virtue of the 
enactment of the Civil Service Act which guaranteed open and fair 
competitiOn for Jobs." 
They went on to argue th<l:t the Griggs standard had been satisfied. 
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training school success, if demonstrated at all, did not 
satisfy what it deemed to be the crucial requirement 
of a direct relationship between performance on Test 21 
and performance on the policeman's job. 
We agree with petitioners and the federal respondents 
that this was error. The advisability of the police re-
cruit training course informing the recruit about his 
upcoming job, acquainting him with its demands and 
attempting to impart a modicum of required skills seems 
conceded. It is also apparent to us, as it was to the 
District Judge, that some minimum verbal and com-
municative skill would be very useful, if not essential, 
to satisfactory progress in the training regimen. Based 
on the evidence before him, the District Judge concluded 
that Test 21 was directly related to the requirements of 
the police training program and that a positive relation-
ship between the test and training course performance 
was sufficient to validate the former, wholly aside from 
its possible relationship to actual performance as a police 
officer. This conclusion of the District Judge is sup-
ported by regulations of the Civil Service Commission, 
by the opinion evidence placed before the District Judge 
and by the current views of the Civil Service Com-
missioners who were parties to the case.16 Nor is the 
16 See n. 17, infra. Current instructions of the Civil Service 
CommiSSIOn on "Exammmg, Testing, Standards, and Employment 
PractiCes" provide in pertinent part . 
"S2-2-Use of applicant appraisal procedures 
"a Policy. The Commission's staff develops and uses applicant 
appraisal procedures to assess the knowledges, skills, and abilities of 
persons for jobs and not persons in the abstract. 
11 
( 1) Appraisal procedures are designed to reflect real, reasonable, 
and necessary qualifications for effective job behavior. 
11 (2) An appraisal procedure must, among other requirements, . 
have a demonstrable and rational relationship to important job-· 
related performance objectives identified by Illilnagement, such as.:.: 
11 (a) Effective job l?erformance ; 
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conclusion foreclosed by either Griggs or Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975); and it seems to 
us the much more sensible construction of the job re~ 
latedness requirement. 
The District .Court's accompanying conclusion that 
Test 21 was in fact directly related to the requirements 
of the police training program was supported by a vali-
dation study, as well as by other evidence of record; 17 
11 (b) Capability; 
"(c) Success in training; 
" (d) Reduced turnover; or 
" (e) Job satisfaction." 37 Fed. Reg. 21557 (Oct. 12, 1972). 
See also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on 
Employment Selection Procedures, 29 CFR § 1607.5 (b) (3), dis-
cussed in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U, S. 405, 430-435 
(1975) . 
:17 The record includes a validation study of Test 21's relationship 
to performance in the recruit training program. The study was 
made by D. L. Futransky of the Standards Division, Bureau of 
Policies and Standards, United States Civil Service Commission. 
Appendix, at 99-109. Findings of the study included data "sup-
port[ing] the conclusion that T[ est] 21 is effective in selecting 
trainees who can learn the material that is taught at the Recruit 
School." App. 103. Opinion evidence, submitted by qualified 
experts examining the Furtransky study andjor conducting their 
own research, affirmed the correlation between scores on Test 21 
and success in the training program. E. g., Affidavit of Dr. Donald 
R. Schwartz (personnel research psychologist, U. S. Civil Service 
Commission), Appendix, at 178, 183 ("It is my opinion . .. that 
Test 21 has a significant positive correlation with success in the 
MPD Recruit School for both Blacks and whites and is therefore 
shown to be job related ... "); affidavit of Diane E. Wilson (per-
sonnel research psychologist, U. S. Civil Service Commission), Ap-
pendix, at 185, 186 ("It is my opinion that there is a direct and ra-
tional relationship between the content and difficulty of Test 21 and 
successful completion of recruit school training:"). 
The Court of Appeals was "willing to assume for the purposes 
of this appeal that appellees have shown that Test 21 is predictive · 
Qf further progress in Recruit SchooV' 512 F. 2d, at. 962 ... 
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and we are not convinced that this conclusion was 
erroneous. 
The federal parties, whose views have somewhat 
changed since the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
who still insist that training-program validation is suffi-
cient, now urge a remand to the District Court for the 
purpose of further inquiry into whether the training pro-
gram test scores, which were found to correlate with Test 
21 scores, are themselves an appropriate measure of the 
trainee's mastership of the material taught in the course 
and whether the training program itself is sufficiently 
related to actual performance of the police officer's task. 
We think a remand is inappropriate. The District 
Court's judgment was warranted by the record before 
him, and we perceive no good reason to reopen it, par-
ticularly since we were informed at oral argument that 
although Test 21 is still being administered, the training 
program itself has undergone substantial modification 
in the course of this litigation. If there are now de-
ficiencies in the recruiting practices under prevailing 
Title VII standards, those deficiencies are to be directly 
addressed in accordance with appropriate procedures 
mandated under that section. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and 
the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion., 
So ordered. 
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